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CHECKOSKY, RULE 2(e) AND THE AUDITOR: HOW
SHOULD THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION DEFINE ITS STANDARD OF IMPROPER
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT?.
MARIE L. COPPOLINO*
INTRODUCTION
The Securities and Exchange Commission can use several enforce-
ment and disciplinary tools against professionals.' One such tool,
Rule 2(e) of the SEC's Rules of Practice, enables the SEC to bar tem-
porarily or permanently a professional from appearing or practicing
before it.2 The SEC can bar from practice a professional who lacks
the requisite qualifications to represent others; lacks character or in-
tegrity; engages in unethical or improper professional conduct; or wil-
fully violates, or aids and abets the violation of, any federal securities
law.3 Rule 2(e) allows the SEC "to protect its processes from incom-
* I am grateful to Professor Steven Thel for reading earlier drafts of this Note.
1. The SEC's arsenal includes the following: Rule 2(e) of the SEC's Rules of
Practice and Procedure, 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1994); civil injunctive actions brought in
federal district court under § 20(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act"), 15
U.S.C. § 77t (1988 & Supp. V 1993), and § 21(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 ("Exchange Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1988 & Supp. V 1993); administrative pro-
ceedings under § 15(c)(4) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 780 (1988 & Supp. V
1993); stop order proceedings under § 8(d) of the Securities Act to suspend the effec-
tiveness of a registration statement, 15 U.S.C. § 77h (1988); report of investigation
disseminated publicly by the Commission under § 21(a) of the Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78u (1988 & Supp. V 1993); and entry of an administrative order requiring
any person to cease and desist from violation of the federal securities laws under the
Securities Enforcement and Penny Stock Report Act of 1990,15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-1, 78u-
3 (Supp. V 1993). See Robert J. Haft, Liability of Attorneys and Accountants for
Securities Transactions § 8.01, at 8-1 (1994-95 ed.) (listing SEC enforcement and dis-
ciplinary mechanisms).
2. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1) (1994).
3. Id. In full, Rule 2(e)(1) provides:
The Commission may deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of ap-
pearing or practicing before it in any way to any person who is found by the
Commission after notice of and opportunity for hearing in the matter (i) not
to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others, or (ii) to be lack-
ing in character or integrity or to have engaged in unethical or improper
professional conduct, or (iii) to have willfully violated, or willfully aided and
abetted the violation of any provision of the Federal securities laws (15
U.S.C. §§ 77a to 80b-20), or the rules and regulations thereunder.
Id
Practicing before the Commission includes, but is not limited to, "(1) transacting
any business with the Commission; and (2) the preparation of any statement, opinion
or other paper... filed with the Commission in any registration statement, notifica-
tion, application, report or other document with the consent" of the professional. Id.
§ 201.2(g). The Commission has interpreted this section regarding practice broadly,
especially as it pertains to attorneys. See Daniel L Goelzer & Susan Ferris Wyderko,
Rule 2(e): Securities and Exchange Commission Discipline of Professionals, 85 Nw. U.
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petent, unethical, or dishonest professionals by excluding from prac-
tice (or limiting the activities of) those who have violated the federal
securities laws or the standards of their own profession in the course
of their prior contacts with the [SEC]." 4 Further, the Rule "affords
the Commission a vehicle to engage, to a limited degree, in profes-
sional standard-setting."'5 While the SEC has instituted relatively few
2(e) proceedings against attorneys during the decade following the
1981 decision in In re Carter and Johnson,6 the use of Rule 2(e)
against accountants who audit public companies has increased.7
The use of Rule 2(e) against all professionals is controversial. 8 The
SEC's statutory authority under the Rule-especially as applied to at-
torneys-is questionable, and state licensing bodies and professional
associations perhaps can better monitor professional conduct. 9 In ad-
dition, the SEC applies an imprecise standard of culpability to profes-
sionals practicing before the Commission. In May 1994, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia examined this ambiguous stan-
dard when it reviewed a suspension order by the SEC in Checkosky v.
SEC,10 a Rule 2(e) proceeding against two Coopers & Lybrand audi-
tors charged with misconduct during an audit. The court remanded
the case to the Commission to clarify its opinion as to the standard of
conduct the Commission applied to the auditors." In a separate hold-
ing, one judge noted:
L. Rev. 652, 661 (1991) (explaining that because much of the lawyer's work involves
counseling clients and preparing documents upon which the SEC and the investing
public rely, there is little that a securities lawyer can do that is not covered by Rule
2(e)).
4. Goelzer & Wyderko, supra note 3, at 653 (citation omitted).
5. Id
[B]oth the 1933 and 1934 Acts authorize the Commission to define account-
ing terms and to prescribe "the items or details to be shown in the balance
sheet and earning statement, and the methods to be followed in the prepara-
tion of accounts, in the appraisal or valuation of assets and liabilities ...."
Louis Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 157 (2d ed. 1988) (quoting Securi-
ties Act § 19(a); Exchange Act § 13(b)). Despite this conferred power, the SEC in-
stead has "chosen to rely for the most part on the [accounting] profession to establish
generally accepted accounting principles." Id. at 159-60.
6. 47 S.E.C. 471 (Feb. 28, 1981). Carter perhaps is the most controversial Rule
2(e) decision to date. See infra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 83, subdivision (1).
8. See infra part I.B.
9. See infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
10. 23 F.3d 452 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (per curiam).
11. Il at 454. In November 1994, the SEC issued an order scheduling the filing of
briefs for the Checkosky remand. Exchange Act Release No. 34,983, 58 SEC Dock.
17 (Nov. 14, 1994). Parties were ordered to address the following issues in their
briefs:
(1) At what minimum level of culpability may [the] Commission sanction an
accountant for failure to comply with GAAP and GAAS;
(2) Need the culpability standard be specifically alleged in an order for pro-
ceedings concerning improper professional conduct;
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The Commission has variously indicated that different levels of
mental culpability are needed to make out a 2(e)(1)(ii) violation by
professionals... : simple negligence as the Commission privately
held in Schulzetenberg; gross negligence implied by the "so defi-
cient" language of Haskins & Sells; recklessness hinted by the Com-
mission in its opinion below; or willfulness or bad faith suggested by
Logan and Carter.... [T]he Commission must choose its standard
and forthrightly apply it to this case.'
2
This judge suggested that on remand, the Commission must prove, at
a minimum, that the auditors misinterpreted Generally Accepted Ac-
counting Principles ("GAAP") and violated Generally Accepted Au-
diting Standards ("GAAS"). 13  The judges, however, disagreed
regarding what level of mental culpability, if any, beyond this mini-
mum must be proven.'
4
Though, as the Checkosky court noted, the SEC has not adhered to
a single standard of mental culpability in Rule 2(e) actions, a few deci-
sions in Rule 2(e) cases during the last decade have suggested that
mere negligence is sufficient to prevail against an auditor or an ac-
counting firm. 5 On the whole, however, Rule 2(e) cases show that
(3) Does any misinterpretation of GAAP by an accountant or any failure to
conform with GAAS constitute negligence, and is it improper professional
conduct;
(4) What constitutes recklessness for purposes of Rule 2(e)(1)(ii); and
(5) What facts, if any, in the record demonstrate that Respondents did or
did not act recklessly or negligently.
Id
12. Checkosky, 23 F.3d at 462 (Silberman, J.). The cases referred to are: In re
Schulzetenberg, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-6881, slip. op. at 2 (Nov. 10, 1987) (holding
that mere negligence does warrant disciplinary action under Rule 2(e) because "an
incompetent or negligent auditor can do just as much harm to public investors and
others who rely on him as one who acts with an improper motive"); In re Carter, 47
S.E.C. 471, 512 (Feb. 28, 1981) (holding that an attorney who exercises good faith and
"exert[s] reasonable efforts to prevent violations of the law by his client" meets the
professional conduct standard); In re Haskins & Sells, Accounting Series Release No.
73 [1937-82 Transfer Binder] 72,092, at 62,197 (Oct. 30, 1952) (holding that good
faith is no defense where accountants' conduct is "so deficient" that it constitutes
"their failure to give [the] professional undertaking the degree of care and inquiry it
demanded under the circumstances"); In re Logan, 10 S.E.C. 982, 985 (Jan. 7, 1942)
(suggesting in dictum that good faith is a defense to accusations of improper profes-
sional conduct).
13. Checkosky, 23 F.3d at 456 (Silberman, J.).
14. Id. (Silberman, J.) (noting that the question of whether simple negligence is
sufficient to meet the standard of improper professional conduct under Rule 2(e) was
not properly presented to the court and accordingly was not answered); id. at 480
(Randolph, J.) (concluding that negligence is the proper standard applicable to audi-
tor's conduct under Rule 2(e)); id. at 494 (Reynolds, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part) (same).
15. See Checkosky, 23 F3d 452, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (Randolph, J.)
("Judge Reynolds [concurring in part, dissenting in part] and I know what the Com-
mission determined, as does everyone who is in the least bit familiar with this case-
the Commission decided that negligence is enough."); id. at 494 (Reynolds, J., concur-
ring in part, dissenting in part); Danna v. SEC, No. C-93-4158, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7256, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 1994) ("[T]he Commission's authority to protect its
1995] 2229
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auditors frequently consent to findings of improper professional con-
duct when they have merely erred in matters of professional judg-
ment.16 These orders rarely describe the auditor's level of culpability.
On the contrary, the orders simply describe supposed misinterpreta-
tions of GAAP and allege violations of GAAS.
Not all errors in professional judgment violate GAAS and GAAP,
and therefore not all misjudgments should violate Rule 2(e). 17 Clearly
erroneous violations of GAAS and GAAP, of course, must be sanc-
tioned, and guidelines regarding such errors are set forth explicitly in
these standards. 8 But GAAS can not provide clear-cut guidance for
all circumstances that can arise during an audit. As a result, an audi-
tor who exercises due professional care and obtains sufficient compe-
tent evidential matter can still reach improper conclusions. Therefore,
ex post facto criticisms of non-negligent, honest, and justified profes-
sional decisions must not be the basis for accusations of improper pro-
fessional conduct.
This Note asserts that the SEC must implement a reasonable audi-
tor standard to determine an auditor's protected range of professionaljudgment under Rule 2(e). Violations of GAAS and misinterpreta-
tions of GAAP that fall outside a reasonable auditor's range of pro-
fessional judgment should be deemed improper professional conduct
own processes through Rule 2(e) proceedings is not necessarily limited to instances of
bad faith or intentional misconduct."); supra note 12 and accompanying text; see also
Haft, supra note 1, § 8.01, at 8-3 (claiming that negligent violations of GAAS and
GAAP are sufficient for proceedings based on improper professional conduct); Joel
Seligman, Accounting and the New Corporate Law, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 943, 957(1993) (claiming that under Rule 2(e), "the Commission only has to prove the
equivalent to negligence, rather than scienter").
On remand, the SEC is arguing that "negligence, meaning failure to comply with
applicable professional standards that is unreasonable under the circumstances, con-
stitutes the minimum level of culpability for the Commission to censure or suspend an
auditor from practice before it under Rule 2(e)." Brief of the Office of the Chief
Accountant on Remand at 2, In re Checkosky, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-6776 (Jan. 13,
1995) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
16. See infra part II.A.5.; see also infra note 84 (discussing auditors' consents to
settlements) and text accompanying note 141 (discussing why most Rule 2(e) cases
are settled).
17. Securities regulation experts support the view that negligent conduct is action-
able under Rule 2(e)(1)(ii). See, e.g., Haft, supra note 1, § 8.01, at 8-3 (claiming that
negligent violations of GAAS and GAAP are sufficient for proceedings based on
improper professional conduct); Seligman, supra note 15, at 957 (claiming that under
Rule 2(e), "the Commission only has to prove the equivalent to negligence, rather
than scienter"). Because negligence is sufficient to meet Rule 2(e)'s improper profes-
sional conduct standard, the more egregious violations that are considered reckless
and willful also violate the Rule.
18. See, e.g., Codification of Statements on Auditing Standards ("AICPA"), State-
ments on Auditing Standards ("AU") § 315 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants
1991) (requiring that a successor auditor communicate with the predecessor auditor
whom he or she is replacing); id AU § 337 (requiring that an auditor obtain evidential
matter relevant to litigation; claims, and assessments).
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for purposes of Rule 2(e)(1)(ii). 19 Part I of this Note provides a back-
ground for Rule 2(e) proceedings. It includes a brief history of the
Rule, case law supporting the SEC's authority to apply the Rule, and
a summary of the controversies surrounding the Rule's use. In addi-
tion, it introduces the Rule's application to auditors. Part II outlines
the results of a survey of Rule 2(e)(1)(ii) decisions rendered against
auditors in the past decade. These results support the need for a rea-
sonable auditor standard. The survey compares criteria such as the
most often-violated GAAS requirements and the sanctions imposed
on auditors for such violations. Further, the survey observes that the
Commission only addresses the level of culpability when determining
the appropriate sanction for misconduct, rather than when first decid-
ing whether an auditor's professional conduct was improper under the
Rule. Part III analyzes two Rule 2(e)(1)(ii) cases in which the Com-
mission sanctioned auditors for debatable errors in professional judg-
ment. This part concludes that the auditors' conduct would not have
been actionable under a reasonable auditor standard. Finally, part IV
argues that the Commission must expound and consistently apply a
reasonable auditor standard when determining whether an auditor
meets the improper professional conduct standard. This standard
gives the Commission the leeway necessary to protect its processes,
yet does not penalize an auditor for justified errors made in exercising
professional judgment.
I. RULE 2(e)'s BACKGROUND
Rule II of the Commission's Rules of Practice, the predecessor to
Rule 2(e), was adopted in 193520 under the SEC's general rulemaking
power granted in both the Securities Act2  and the Exchange Act. 2
In 1938, the Rule was amended to authorize the Commission to with-
19. For example, under certain circumstances, GAAS requires that an auditor ob-
serve physical inventory counts "as he [or she] deems necessary." Id. AU § 331.11.
While the number of counts observed is a determination left to the individual auditor,
a reasonable auditor, after exercising professional judgment, would observe between
40% and 60% of the total dollar value of the inventory under specific circumstances.(These percentages are included only for purposes of this hypothetical; GAAS do not
delineate specific percentages.) Observing counts comprising only 5% must be con-
sidered clearly erroneous and, therefore, outside the auditor's protected realm of pro-
fessional judgment This decision should constitute improper professional conduct
under Rule 2(e)(1)(ii). Nevertheless, counting 40% where the SEC would have pre-
ferred 60% should not constitute improper professional conduct.
20. 1 Fed. Reg. 1753 (1936) (effective September 13, 1935); see also Goelzer &
Wyderko, supra note 3, at 654 (referring to SEC Ann. Rep. 45-53 (1935)). After
amendments in 1936, Rule II contained provisions governing admissions to practice,
under which persons "of good moral character [and with] the requisite qualifications
to represent others [could] be admitted to practice as an Attorney or Agent before
the Commission." 2nd Ann. Rep. of the SEC 61 (1936).
21. Securities Act of 1933, § 19(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1988)).
22. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 23(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)
(1988)).
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hold any person's z3 privilege of appearing or practicing before it if
that person did not possess the requisite qualifications to represent
others, lacked character or integrity, or engaged in unethical or im-
proper professional conduct. 24 The SEC again amended Rule 2(e) in
September 1970 to suspend automatically any person who:
"(1) had been suspended or disbarred from practice or who has had
his license to practice suspended or revoked by a state licensing au-
thority, (2) had been convicted of a felony or of a misdemeanor
involving moral turpitude, or (3) had been suspended or disbarred
by a court of competent jurisdiction."
The amendments also added a third category to Rule 2(e), subpara-
graph (1)(iii), which provides" 'that the Commission may deny a pro-
fessional the privilege of appearing or practicing before it for the
willful violation, or the willful aiding and abetting of a violation, of the
federal securities laws or the rules and regulations thereunder.' 26
The most recent alteration to the Rule was made in 1988, when the
Commission determined that all Rule 2(e) hearings must be public
unless the Commission directs otherwise.2 7 Beginning in 1993, the
SEC's Division of Enforcement replaced its Office of the General
Counsel28 as the authority responsible for prosecuting Rule 2(e)
actions.2 9
Until the 1970s, the "universally understood purpose of Rule 2(e)
was to assure the integrity of SEC processes through enforcement of
appropriate conduct by professionals practicing before the SEC. Ac-
cordingly, the Rule was invoked episodically in reaction to evidence of
23. Although "person" for Rule 2(e) purposes generally has referred to only ac-
countants and lawyers over the years, there are two reported Rule 2(e) proceedings
against other professionals. See In re Browne, Securities Act Release No. 32,854, 54
SEC Dock. 1991, 1991 (Sept. 9, 1993) (engineer); In re McDowell, Securities Act Re-
lease No. 5903, 14 SEC Dock. 64, 64 (Feb. 2, 1978) (geologist).
24. See Goelzer & Wyderko, supra note 3, at 654; 10 Louis Loss & Joel Seligman,
Securities Regulation 4800 (2d ed. 1989). This amendment currently is codified at
Rule 2(e)(1). 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1)(i)-(ii) (1994).
25. 10 Loss & Seligman, supra note 24, at 4800 (quoting In re Carter, 47 S.E.C.
471, 476-77 (Feb. 28, 1981)).
26. Id- (quoting Carter, 47 S.E.C. at 476-77).
27. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(7) (1994).
28. The Office of General Counsel had acted on behalf of the Office of the Chief
Accountant. SEC Announces Organizational Changes as to Accountants, Consumer
Affairs, Reg., Econ. and L., 1993 Daily Exec. Rep. (BNA) No. 236, at D-3 (Dec. 10,
1993).
29. Id. In addition, in 1994, the Commission announced that it transferred its
"delegation of authority for advice and activities concerning certain proceedings con-
ducted" under Rule 2(e) from the Chairman's Executive Assistant to the Office of the
General Counsel (hereinafter OGC). Delegation of Authority to the Office of the
General Counsel, 59 Fed. Reg. 2361 (1994) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 200). The
OGC's responsibilities include advising the Commission and making certain proce-
dural decisions.
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dereliction in the conduct of such practice."' 3 The character and pur-
pose of Rule 2(e) were then transformed, and the SEC began to treat
"[a]ccountants and lawyers... as 'an enforcement arm of the SEC' to
assure the good behavior of their clients, without express statutory
authority from... Congress. ' 31 Consequently, as the SEC began to
focus more on these professionals, the number of Rule 2(e) proceed-
ings increased greatly.32
Under Rule 2(e), sanctions imposed against professionals range
from censures to permanent bars from appearing or practicing before
the Commission.3 3 Within this realm, the SEC can suspend a profes-
sional temporarily or can set a specific period of time before a profes-
sional whose privileges before the Commission have been
"permanently" denied may apply to have those privileges reinstated.3
Each proceeding is decided on a case-by-case basis; the sanction that
is "appropriate in the public interest depends on the facts and circum-
stances of each particular case and cannot be precisely determined by
comparison with that taken in other proceedings."35 The sanction,
however, must be "limited to that necessary to protect the investing
public and the Commission from the future impact [of improper pro-
fessional conduct] on its processes.13 6
30. R. James Gornley, The Law of Accountants and Auditors I 13.04[1][b], at 13-
36 (1981).
31. Id 13.04[1][b], at 13-37 (quoting SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 590 F.2d 785,
788 (9th Cir. 1979)).
32. See Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, SEC Moves Against Attorneys Under
the Remedies Act, N.Y.L-J., Sept. 23, 1993, at 5 (describing the 1970s as a "'reign of
terror' on broker-dealers, accountants and attorneys" (quoting Robert W. Emerson,
Rule 2(e) Revisited: SEC Disciplining of Attorneys Since In re Carter, 29 Am. Bus.
L.. 155, 176 (1991))).
33. The degrees of sanctions include censure, temporary bar, permanent bar with
time specified after which the auditor can apply to have his or her privileges rein-
stated, and a permanent bar. See symbols a2-12 in the Appendix.
34. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
35. In re Ernst & Ernst, 46 S.E.C. 1234, 1273 n.73 (May 31, 1978). The Commis-
sion considers the following circumstances in determining the appropriate remedy in a
Rule 2(e) proceeding:
"(1) the gravity of the misconduct or other professional deficiency involved;
(2) whether the misconduct or deficiency arose in connection with appearing
or practicing before the Commission; (3) whether the problems which led to
the proceeding appear to result more from institutional faults than individ-
ual failings; (4) the degree to which the misconduct or other deficiency casts
doubt upon an individual's ability or willingness to perform competent and
reliable professional services in the future; (5) whether the individual or firm
involved has been the subject of any previous enforcement action or Rule
2(e) proceeding brought by the Commission; (6) the experience of the Com-
mission's staff in conducting the investigation which led to institution of a
proceeding; and (7) other similar considerations."
2 Loss & Seligman, supra note 24, at 736 n.299 (quoting The Accounting Establish-
ment: A Staff Study, Subcomrn. on Rep., Acct. & Mgmt., Senate Comm. on Gov't
Operations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1476-1477 (Comm. Print 1976)).
36. In re Carter, 47 S.E.C. 471, 477 (Feb. 28, 1981).
1995] 2233
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Most Rule 2(e) disciplinary proceedings against auditors and audit
firms are settled.37 Frequently, the settlements call for such steps as
completion of continuing professional education programs, peer re-
view, or review of the firm's auditing procedures by persons satisfac-
tory to the Commission's Chief Accountant.38 Occasionally, the SEC
imposes a sanction that distinguishes an accountant's privilege of pre-
paring or reviewing documents to be filed with the Commission from
the ability to appear as an independent public accountant before the
Commission.39
A. Rule 2(e) is Applied Differently to Accountants and Attorneys
Various commentators have questioned whether accountants and
attorneys should be treated similarly under Rule 2(e).40 Former Com-
37. Haft, supra note 1, § 8.01[2], at 8-3; 2 Loss & Seligman, supra note 24, at 697-
98. Although most Rule 2(e) cases are settled, the reasonable auditor standard pro-
posed herein can be used to evaluate the auditor's conduct in settlement negotiations.
38. 2 Loss & Seligman, supra note 24, at 697-98. For example, see In re Venezia,
Exchange Act Release No. 33,961, 56 SEC Dock. 1505 (Apr. 25, 1994), where the
Commission issued a consent order denying the privilege of appearing or practicing
before the Commission whereby:
Five years after the effective date of the Commission's denial of the privilege
of appearing or practicing before the Commission, Venezia may apply to
resume appearing or practicing before the Commission as:
1) a preparer or reviewer... provided that... his work will be reviewed by
the independent audit committee of the company or in some other manner
acceptable to the staff of the Commission;
2) an independent accountant upon submission of an application to the Of-
fice of Chief Accountant of the Commission containing a showing satisfac-
tory to the Commission that:
a. Venezia, or any firm with which he is or becomes associated in any
capacity, is and will remain a member of the SEC Practice Section of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants' Division for CPA
F'rms;
b. Venezia, or any firm with which he is or becomes associated in any
capacity, has received an unqualified report relating to his most recent
peer review conducted in accordance with the guidelines adopted by the
SEC Practice Section; and
c. Venezia will comply with all applicable SEC Practice Section require-
ments, including all requirements for periodic peer reviews, concurring
partner reviews, and continuing professional education, as long as he ap-
pears or practices before the Commission as an independent accountant.
Id. at 1507-08. The consent order further provided that the "Commission's review of
any application by Venezia to resume appearing or practicing before the Commission
may include consideration of any other matter relating to the character, integrity,
professional conduct or qualifications of Venezia to practice before the Commission."
Il at 1508.
39. See, e.g., In re Silvestain, Exchange Act Release No. 34,631, 57 SEC Dock.
1398, 1403 (Sept. 2, 1994) (imposing different requirements when auditor resumed
appearing as a preparer or reviewer than when he appeared as an independent ac-
countant); In re Withers, Exchange Act Release No. 34,537, 57 SEC Dock. 1048, 1056
(Aug. 17, 1994) (same).
40. See Samuel H. Gruenbaum, The SEC's Use of Rule 2(e) to Discipline Account-
ants and Other Professionals, 56 Notre Dame Law. 820, 820-21 (1981). The differ-
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missioner Roberta Karmel noted: "Disciplinary action against ac-
countants and attorneys must rest on very different legal analyses and
involves very different policy questions. The Commission has con-
founded the very real issues involved in disciplining these two dispa-
rate professions by adhering to a single overly broad rule for enforcing
professional responsibility."'" Recently, courts have recognized this
difference as well.
In re Carter and Johnson,2 a 1981 SEC decision, involved a Rule
2(e) action against two attorneys charged with aiding and abetting se-
curities law violations. The Commission distinguished the roles of ac-
countants and attorneys, stating that while accountants have a duty to
those who justifiably rely on their reports, lawyers, on the other hand,
traditionally have a duty only to their clients, not to the public.4 3 De-
spite the lawyer's limited role, the Commission may take action where
an attorney becomes a "conscious participant in violations of the se-
curities laws, or performs his professional function without regard to
the consequences." 4 Concerned with the unclear obligations of se-
curities lawyers, the Commission set forth its interpretation of Rule
2(e)(1)(ii)'s "unethical or improper professional conduct" standard:
When a lawyer with significant responsibilities in ... [effectuating]
... a company's compliance with the disclosure requirements of the
federal securities laws becomes aware that his client is engaged in a
substantial and continuing failure to satisfy those disclosure require-
ments, his continued participation violates professional standards
unless he takes prompt steps to end the client's noncompliance.45
The Commission did not retroactively impose this interpretation of
the standard.4"
ences in applying Rule 2(e) to accountants and attorneys also is evident where
commentators focus on only one of these professions when analyzing Rule 2(e). See
Norman S. Johnson, The Dynamics of SEC Rule 2(e): A Crisis for the Bar, 1975 Utah
L. Rev. 629 (focusing on attorneys); Michael J. Crane, Note, Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Accountants: The Need for a More Ascertainable Improper Professional Con-
duct Standard in the SEC's Rule 2(e), 53 Fordham L Rev. 351 (1984) (focusing on
accountants); Note, SEC Disciplinary Proceedings Against Attorneys Under Rule 2(e),
79 Mich. L. Rev. 1270, 1275 (1981) [hereinafter Note, SEC Disciplinary Proceedings]
(focusing on attorneys).
41. In re Nielsen, Exchange Act Release No. 16,479, 19 SEC Dock. 158, 161-62
(Jan. 10, 1980) (Karmel, Comm'r, dissenting).
42. 47 S.E.C. 471 (Feb. 28, 1981).
43. Carter, 47 S.E.C. at 478; cf. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y.
1931) (requiring privity to make auditor who makes negligent misrepresentations lia-
ble to third parties).
44. Carter, 47 S.E.C. at 478. Auditors are held to this same standard under Rule2(e)(1)(iii).
45. 47 S.E.C. at 511.
46. 1&
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Since the Carter and Johnson decision, the SEC has not instituted
proceedings against attorneys under Rule 2(e)(1)(ii).47 Nevertheless,
commentators have argued that the SEC's authority under Rule 2(e)
interferes with an attorney's ethical obligation to represent a client
zealously. 48 The Commission's General Counsel responded to this
criticism in 1982 by assuring that he would not recommend proceed-
ings against lawyers appearing as advocates, because doing so could
have a chilling effect on the adequate representation of clients.49 In
1988, the Commission confirmed this policy, maintaining that the
Commission did not intend to develop or apply independent standards
of professional conduct for attorneys." Subsequently, the SEC gener-
ally has used Rule 2(e) proceedings only where a judicial or adminis-
trative order found that an attorney's conduct violated a securities
law.51 Still, the SEC's ability to apply Rule 2(e) to attorneys, as well
as to accountants, continues to be a source of controversy within and
outside of the Commission."
47. Goelzer & Wyderko, supra note 3, at 665; Haft, supra note 1, § 8.01[2], at 8-3;
Block & Hoff, supra note 32, at 5. The Commission recently has instituted public
administrative proceedings against attorneys under its cease-and-desist authority, de-
rived from the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of
1990. Sec. 102, Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (1990). Use of cease-and-desist, like
Rule 2(e), authority has been controversial. See Block & Hoff, supra note 32, at 5.
48. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 40, at 644-50 (stating that the SEC's new stan-
dards are contrary to "traditional canons of the bar"); Steven C. Krane, The Attorney
Unshackled. SEC Rule 2(e) Violates Clients' Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 57
Notre Dame Law. 50, 51 (1981) (claiming that Rule 2(e) has a chilling effect that
violates a client's right to counsel); Harold Marsh, Jr., Rule 2(e) Proceedings, 35 Bus.
Law. 987, 1010-11 (1980) (asserting that Rule 2(e) "substantially impairs the right of
[clients] to be represented by free and unintimidated counsel"); Note, SEC Discipli-
nary Proceedings, supra note 40, at 1275 (arguing that SEC proceedings against law-
yers undermine a client's right to effective counsel).
49. Edward F. Greene, Lawyer Disciplinary Proceedings Before the Securities and
Exchange Commission, 14 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 169-70 (1982); Securi-
ties Act Release No. 6783, 41 SEC Dock. 388, 394-95 (July 7, 1988). Because auditors
do not prepare their clients' financial statements, but rather review, test, and issue
opinions on these statements, similar arguments pertaining to accountants' roles as
advocates are not applicable.
50. Specifically, the Commission claimed that "as a matter of policy, [the SEC]
generally refrains from using its administrative forum to conduct de novo determina-
tions of the professional obligations of attorneys." Haft, supra note 1, § 8.01[2], at 8-3
(citing Exchange Act Release No. 25,893, 53 Fed. Reg. 26,427, 26,431 (1988)).
Most recently, the Eleventh Circuit rejected an argument that Rule 2(e) intimidates
attorneys and thus precludes attorneys from providing adequate representation for
their clients. Sheldon v. S.E.C., No. 93-4055, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 3724, at *7 (11th
Cir. Feb. 24, 1995). The court asserted: "Having attorneys subject to ethical stan-
dards constitutes a safeguard for all parties in a proceeding, not intimidation." Id. at
*8.
51. Haft, supra note 1, § 8.01[2], at 8-3; see also supra text accompanying note 47
(noting that no Rule 2(e)(1)(ii) actions have been instituted against attorneys since
the Carter and Johnson decision).
52. Goelzer & Wyderko, supra note 3, at 656; Roberta S. Karmel, Rule 2(e)-A
Reprise, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 21, 1993, at 3.
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B. Despite Judicial Acceptance, the Commission's Application of
Rule 2(e) to Auditors is Questioned
While the SEC's authority to sanction attorneys is questionable, its
authority to sanction accountants is judicially well-established. Based
on the statute's purpose, three courts of appeals have upheld the
Commission's authority in cases involving accountants.5 3 Despite
these decisions,' commentators continue to question the SEC's disci-
plinary authority under Rule 2(e). 5 These critics maintain that the
SEC lacks express statutory authority to discipline professionals (both
accountants and attorneys) and that Congress never intended the
Commission to have such power.5 6 Many commentators agree that
this regulation extends beyond the SEC's authority to protect its
processes.5 7
53. Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (per curiam); Davy v. SEC,
792 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1986); Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC. 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979).
54. See infra notes 58-75 and accompanying text.
55. See Arthur Best, Shortcomings of Administrative Agency Lawyer Discipline 31
Emory L.J. 535, 535 (1982) (arguing that the SEC should defer its Rule 2(e) powers to
the general disciplinary system); Robert A. Downing & Richard L Miller, Jr., The
Distortion and Misuse of Rule 2(e), 54 Notre Dame Law. 774, 786 (1979) (contending
that the Commission's objective is "to subjugate the accounting profession to [its]
day-to-day control" via Rule 2(e)); Gruenbaum, supra note 40, at 824-28, 832-37
(finding problems with Rule 2(e) proceedings against entire firms, the Rule's stan-
dards of proof, and culpability); Johnson, supra note 40, at 657 (stressing problems
with Rule 2(e)'s burden of proof and lack of any identifiable standard of care for
lawyers); Karnel, supra note 52, at 3 (asserting that the Rule 2(e) controversy arose
because "the [C]ommission has simply arrogated [disciplinary power under Rule 2(e)]
to itself, claiming expertise and the need for private sector assistance in policing the
securities markets. However, the licensing and discipline of attorneys and account-
ants is a matter properly committed to state licensing bodies and professional associa-
tions."); Krane, supra note 48, at 77-84 (arguing that the restrictions Rule 2(e) places
on an attorney interfere with his or her client's right to counsel); Marsh, supra note
48, at 1010-15 (raising constitutional questions regarding substantive and procedural
due process as applied to Rule 2(e)); Marvin G. Pickholz, SEC Regulation of Profes-
sionals, 4 Rev. Fmn. Serv. Reg. 165, 167 (1988) (alleging that Rule 2(e) use violates
Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment); Note. SEC
Disciplinary Proceedings, supra note 40, at 1275-76 (claiming that Rule 2(e) proceed-
ings against attorneys (1) undermine the adversary system and the client's right to
effective counsel and (2) threaten the balance between state and federal law by feder-
alizing professional responsibility).
56. See; eg., infra part I.B.2 (providing Commissioner Karmel's criticism of SEC's
use of Rule 2(e)).
57. This Note contends that the SEC has the authority to promulgate Rule 2(e)
against all professionals.
Within the Commission, former Commissioner Karmel has been the strongest critic
of Rule 2(e)'s application to attorneys. In an often-quoted dissent from In re Keating,
Muething & Klekamp, 47 S.E.C. 95 (July 2, 1979), she claimed that the Commission
did not possess the "mandate [or the] expertise to protect the public against unethical
or incompetent attorneys," id. at 110, and further argued that the Rule's use "neces-
sarily impinges upon and interferes with a client's right to counsel," id. at 115. Similar
to her dissent in In re Nielsen, Exchange Act Release No. 16,479, 19 SEC Dock. 158,
159 (Jan. 10, 1980), a Rule 2(e) proceeding against an auditor, she stressed the Com-
mission's lack of statutory power to discipline attorneys. See infra part I.B.2. In par-
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1. Rule 2(e) Preserves the Integrity of the Commission's Processes
In Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 8 the Second Circuit upheld the
SEC's authority to discipline auditors under Rule 2(e). While the
court acknowledged that there was "no express statutory provision au-
thorizing the Commission to discipline professionals appearing before
it," 59 it also recognized that this authority could be implied because
the Rule had been in effect for over forty years with no court ever
finding it invalid.6" After distinguishing the Commission's authority
to discipline professionals from its substantive enforcement functions,
the court refused to find that the statutory scheme 6' negated the
SEC's implied authority under Rule 2(e).62 The court reasoned that
Rule 2(e) regulation furthers the legitimate statutory purpose of pre-
serving the integrity of Commission processes and that in other agency
contexts, courts had upheld the authority of agencies to discipline at-
torneys practicing or appearing before them.63
The Touche Ross court recognized that Rule 2(e) was "promulgated
pursuant to [the Commission's] statutory rulemaking authority [and]
represents an attempt by the Commission to protect the integrity of its
own processes." 6 According to the court, auditors who certify finan-
cial statements must be competent and ethical; otherwise they would
undermine the reliability of the disclosure process.65 Rule 2(e) as-
ticular, Commissioner Karmel opposed the Commission's findings that the internal
procedures of a law firm did not meet professional responsibility standards, likening
the Commission's holding to setting professional standards for attorneys. Keating, 47
S.E.C. at 113-14.
58. 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979).
59. Id at 582.
60. Id. at 578.
61. The statutory scheme refers to the Commission's rulemaking powers under the
1933 Act, the 1934 Act, the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, the Trust
Indenture Act of 1939, the Investment Company Act of 1940, and the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940. Id at 577-78 & n.12. (citations omitted).
62. Id at 579-82.
63. Id. The other agencies referred to are the Board of Tax Appeals, the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service, and the International Claims Commission. Id. at 581
(citing Goldsmith v. United States Bd. of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926); Koden v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 564 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1977); Herman v. Dulles, 205
F.2d 715 (D.C. Cir. 1953)).
64. Id at 582. The court discussed the need for the SEC to "protect the integrity
of its own processes," id at 581, noting that:
By the very nature of its operations, the Commission, with its small staff and
limited resources, cannot possibly examine, with the degree of close scrutiny
required for full disclosure, each of the many financial statements which are
filed. Recognizing this, the Commission necessarily must rely heavily on
both the accounting and legal professions to perform their tasks diligently
and responsibly. Breaches of professional responsibility jeopardize the
achievement of the objectives of the securities laws and can inflict great
damage on public investors.
Id at 580-81.
65. Id at 582.
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sures the Commission that professionals will "perform their tasks dili-
gently and with a reasonable degree of competence." 66
In Davy v. SEC,67 the Ninth Circuit also held that the Commission's
authority to promulgate rules and regulations under the Exchange Act
includes the specific power to discipline accountants.68 Adopting the
reasoning of Touche Ross, the court explained that the SEC's author-
ity is necessary to protect its administrative procedures and the pub-
liC. 69  Moreover, it acknowledged, but noted that no court had
embraced, the Rule 2(e) criticisms asserted by various commentators
and former Commissioner Karmel.70
Most recently, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
upheld the SEC's authority in Checkosky.7 1 The court, also relying
primarily on the Touche Ross decision, emphasized the distinction be-
tween the SEC's valid disciplinary authority over professionals ap-
pearing before it and its legitimate disciplinary authority over
violations of substantive provisions of the securities laws. 2 The latter,
under the Exchange Act's jurisdictional provision, is within the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the federal courts.73 The former, disciplinary au-
thority over professionals, is valid if the regulations are reasonably
related to the underlying statute's purpose.74 In making this distinc-
tion, the court stressed that the Commission promulgated Rule 2(e) to
66. Id.
67. 792 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1986).
68. Id at 1421.
69. See id& at 1421-22. In response to an argument that the SEC cannot regulate
unenumerated persons, the court noted that Rule 2(e) was promulgated under section
23(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, which does not specifically enumer-
ate the persons to whom it applies (unlike Section 14(b) of the 1934 Act, where such
an argument was accepted). IdL at 1422.
70. Id. at 1421-22; see also infra part I.B.2 (summarizing Commissioner Karmel's
criticisms of the SEC's authority under Rule 2(e)).
71. Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
72. 23 F.3d at 456 (Silberman, J.); see id. at 468-72 (Randolph, J.); id. at 493-94
(Reynolds, I., concurring in part, dissenting in part). In Toucize Ross, the accountants
claimed that district courts had exclusive jurisdiction over violations of the securities
laws, and therefore, the "statutory scheme negate[d] any implied authority that the
SEC may discipline accountants pursuant to Rule 2(e)." 609 F.2d at 579. The Touche
Ross court did not accept this argument, because the Supreme Court had held that
agencies can promulgate regulations "if the regulation is in furtherance of a legitimate
statutory purpose." IL (citing Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S.
356 (1973)). The Touche Ross court then concluded that Rule 2(e) furthered a legiti-
mate statutory purpose, holding that under Rule 2(e), the SEC attempted to "protect
the integrity of its own processes. If incompetent or unethical accountants should be
permitted to certify financial statements, the reliability.of the disclosure process
would be impaired." Id. at 581. Relying on this reasoning, in a separate opinion in the
Checkosky case, one judge considered Rule 2(e) and substantive provisions of the
securities law analytically distinct. 23 F.3d at 456 (Silberman, J.).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988).
74. Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973).
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protect its administrative processes and not to complement the SEC's
enforcement arsenal.75
Thus, the SEC's authority to discipline accountants under Rule 2(e)
clearly has been upheld by the three circuit courts that have addressed
this issue. Notably, none of these decisions ruled out the application
of their holdings to Rule 2(e) actions against attorneys.
2. Former Commissioner Karmel Questions the Commission's
Disciplinary Authority
More than a decade since her controversial dissent in In re Niel-
sen,7 6 former Commissioner Karmel continues to question the SEC's
authority to discipline accountants for professional misconduct under
Rule 2(e).77 She contends that the Commission's "statutory authority
to regulate financial statement presentation and independence re-
quirements of accountants is... barely sufficient" to sustain its disci-
plinary authority.78 Moreover, she finds no statutory support for the
SEC to discipline accountants who fail to follow GAAS. " In making
this assertion, she distinguishes the Commission's application of gen-
eral standards of ethics and character from its power to determine the
standards for form and content of financial statements. Former Com-
missioner Karmel has urged the Commission to enunciate a reason-
able standard for evaluating an auditor's professional conduct before
the SEC.80
II. SURVEY OF RULE 2(e) PROCEEDINGS AGAINST AUDITORS8 '
The conclusions in this part are the result of a survey of seventy-five
Rule 2(e) orders'r issued between October 1984 and September
75. Checkosky, 23 F.3d at 456 (Silberman, J.); see id. at 468-70 (Randolph, J.); id.
at 493 (Reynolds, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
76. Exchange Act Release No. 16,479, 19 SEC Dock. 158, 159 (Jan. 10, 1980)
(Karmel, Comm'r, dissenting).
77. Karmel, supra note 52, at 3.
78. Nielsen, 19 SEC Dock. at 160 (Karmel, Comm'r, dissenting).
79. Karmel, supra note 52, at 3.
80. In re Nielsen, Exchange Act Release No. 16,479, 19 SEC Dock. 158, 161 (Jan.
10, 1980) (Karmel, Comm'r, dissenting); Karmel, supra note 52, at 3. Part IV, infra,
addresses the need for a clear and reasonable standard for evaluating an auditor's
professional conduct before the SEC.
81. The survey described in this part was performed by the author of this Note.
82. The 75 cases surveyed are set forth in the Appendix. These cases were gath-
ered as follows: I used a listing of Rule 2(e) decisions rendered in 1984-92, set forth
in 10 Loss & Seligman, supra note 24, ch. 13A at 4804-06 n.62, and did a Lexis search
in the Securities Release file of the Federal Securities Library (using the search "Rule
2(e)") to uncover more recent cases. After reading the cases, I then excluded any
proceedings against (1) attorneys, (2) accountants who weren't acting as auditors, and
(3) accountants not charged under Rule 2(e)(1)(ii) (thus, if the auditor was only
charged under Rule 2(e)(1)(i) or 2(e)(1)(iii), the case was excluded).
The survey of published decisions compares the following: size of firm; level of
auditor; type of business in which audited company was engaged; related actions, if
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1994.83 The survey includes only cases involving accountants acting in
their capacity as independent public accountants, who were found to
have engaged in improper professional conduct, as set forth in Rule
2(e)(1)(ii). 84 Despite the claim that the Commission has not always
applied the same levels of mental culpability in evaluating whether
improper professional conduct violates the Rules few cases reported
at the administrative level considered the issues of negligence, gross
negligence, recklessness, or willfulness at all. Rather, most consent
orders alleged various departures from GAAP and GAAS violations,
noting audit deficiencies without classifying the auditor's conduct ac-
cording to the level of culpability.' While a few federal courts dis-
any, against other accountants, the company, or its officials; other violations commit-
ted by the auditor, number of audits to which the action pertained; whether other
investigations were ongoing during the audit; the sanction imposed; and violations
found by the Commission, which included lack of due professional care, lack of suffi-
cient competent evidence, inadequate level of professional skepticism, inadequate su-
pervision of accountants, undue reliance on management without corroboration, lack
of independence, defect in license status, inadequate planning or performing of audit
procedures, inadequate representations from management or legal counsel, improper
procedures regarding predecessor auditor, improper procedures regarding related
parties, improper action taken with regard to client's internal control system, im-
proper reaction to "red flags," inadequate training, and improper procedures regard-
ing errors and irregularities.
83. The 10-year time frame for the survey is justified as follows:
1) The number of 2(e)(1)(ii) cases has increased during the past decade. My survey
covers the period October 1, 1984, though September 30, 1994. (The Commission
reporting year ends on September 30.) My survey includes 75 cases, which are only
cases against accountants acting in their capacity as auditors. According to Professor
Seligman's listing of the "greater than 120 Rule 2(e) proceedings since 1970," there
were only 38 cases during the period October 1, 1974, through September 30, 1984-
and these 38 cases include actions against accountants acting in capacities other than
auditors (for example, as officers of companies) and attorneys. See Seligman, supra
note 15, at 951-52 n38. Thus, the number of Rule 2(e)(1)(ii) cases against auditors
has at least doubled in the past decade.
2) There is heightened scrutiny of Rule 2(e) cases since such proceedings were re-
quired to be public in 1988. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
3) A law review note published in November 1984 contended that Rule 2(e)'s im-
proper professional conduct standard was unconstitutionally vague and proposed that
the SEC enunciate a more specific standard. Crane, supra note 40, at 359-62. 365-66.
That note proposed using a more specific standard that would enable the SEC to
discipline accountants who negligently failed to comply with professional or SEC
rules. Id. at 354. Because Congress made no changes to the improper professional
conduct standard in Rule 2(e)(1)(ii) since then, that note was used as a springboard
for my research.
84. Note that no orders were discovered where the auditor was found not to have
met the standard of improper professional conduct. This is a result of the procedural
history preceding the order. Most cases are settled; to settle, the auditor consents to a
violation of Rule 2(e)(1)(ii).
85. See supra text accompanying note 12.
86. This appears to be a function of the way that the consent orders are written.
Often a stipulation in the order provides:
Simultaneously with the institution of these proceedings, [respondents] have
submitted Offers of Settlement ("Offers"). Under the terms of the Offers,
which the Commission has determined to accept, [Respondents], without ad-
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cussed mental states of culpability, these courts failed to determine a
minimum culpability requirement.87
A. Summary of Findings
Although the consent orders often neglected to define the standard
of mental culpability required by Rule 2(e),88 the survey reveals many
informative similarities regarding the authority levels of the auditors
disciplined, the number of audits subjected to the Rule 2(e) action,
related securities violations by the auditor's client or other auditors,
frequently observed GAAS violations, and sanctions. The results of
this survey support the need for the proposed reasonable auditor
standard.
Note that percentages included for respondent criteria8 9 and sanc-
tions may appear inflated in some instances because more than one
respondent may be included in a single Rule 2(e) action.90 This out-
come occurs when an order includes actions against more than one
auditor or an auditor as well as his or her firm. The criteria support-
ing the statistics in this survey are listed in the Appendix.
mitting or denying the findings or conclusions herein, except that they admit
the jurisdiction of the Commission over them and over the subject matter of
this proceeding, have consented to the issuance of this Order Instituting Pro-
ceedings and Opinion and Order Pursuant to Rule 2(e) ... and to the sanc-
tions set forth herein.
In re Smith, Exchange Act Release No. 33,963, 56 SEC Dock. 1514, 1515 (Apr. 26,
1994). Understandably, the findings are often slanted toward the Commission's view
of the case, summarizing the facts of the case and matter-of-factly stating what viola-
tions the challenged conduct constituted. See Downing & Miller, supra note 55, at 784
n.43. These authors note:
In certain 2(e) proceedings it is questionable whether the Commission's con-
tentions that an accountant was negligent would pass muster under judicial
standards of due diligence and reasonable care. Indeed, in many 2(e) pro-
ceedings the Commission merely states than an accountant has engaged in
"improper professional conduct" by virtue of some Commission-determined
departure from [GAAS], and without elaboration or specific analysis or
findings which clearly indicate that such departure was due to negligence or
some level of conduct amounting to fault.
Id.
87. In Danna v. SEC, the federal district court for the Northern District of Califor-
nia, however, did suggest that negligence is enough. No. C-93-4158 CW, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7256 (Feb. 8, 1994); see infra notes 197-202 and accompanying text.
88. Often, the findings of fact included language stating that the auditor "knew"
or "should have known" certain relevant facts, or that the amount of evidence gath-
ered was simply insufficient. Even though such language was included, the opinions
failed to state whether the level of conduct found was the minimum necessary under
the circumstances.
89. The term "respondent criteria" refers to whom the Rule 2(e) action was
brought against (e.g., engagement partner, concurring partner, reviewing partner, au-
dit manager, staff accountant, or the entire accounting firm).
90. In other words, the sum of percentages in one area may be greater than 100%.
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1. Respondent Criteria: Against Whom Does the SEC Institute
Rule 2(e) Actions? 91
Engagement partners92-partners in charge of the audit-were
most often the subject of 2(e) proceedings, representing 55% of the
cases surveyed.93 This statistic demonstrates that the SEC usually in-
stitutes actions against the individual who bears primary responsibility
for the audit engagement(s). Surprisingly, the SEC subjected audit
managers,' who follow partners in the line of authority, to Rule 2(e)
actions in only 20% of the cases surveyed and instituted less than 5%
of these proceedings against lower-level auditors.95 Rule 2(e), how-
ever, does not discriminate among the different authority levels within
an auditing firm. Thus, to preserve completely the integrity of the
Commission's processes and to protect the investing public,96 all audi-
tors-regardless of their authority level-should be held to Rule
2(e)'s standard of professional conduct.97
There were nearly twice as many Rule 2(e) cases9" against solo
practitioners99 and small- or mid-sized firms ° ° as compared to Big Six
firms.'01 Thus, allegations that the SEC initiates actions against small-
91. Symbols a-i in the Appendix represent respondent criteria in the cases
surveyed.
92. An engagement partner is primarily responsible both for signing the audit
opinion and reviewing the work of the other auditors on the engagement.
93. In contrast, concurring partners, who review audit workpapers so they have a
basis to concur in the engagement partner's conclusion, were the subject of Rule 2(e)
sanctions in only 4% of the cases surveyed.
94. An audit manager reports to the engagement partner and supervises the junior
auditors (staff accountants and their immediate supervisors, frequently called senior
accountants).
95. Lower-level auditors refers to senior and staff accountants. See supra note 94.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 58-66, 69.
97. Of course, the auditor's level of authority at the time of the audit engagement
must be considered in determining whether the auditor has met the reasonable audi-
tor standard and in determining appropriate sanctions. See infra part IV.B. Higher
level auditors make final decisions and thus are scrutinized more carefully under the
reasonable auditor standard.
98. Of the 75 cases surveyed, the SEC brought 28 (37%) against solo practitioners,
17 (23%) against Big Six firms or members thereof, and 30 (40%) against CPA firms
other than the Big Six or their partnerstemployees. See Appendix.
99. The term refers to auditors who work alone.
100. The term "small- and medium-sized firms" refers to all firms except Big Six
firms and solo practitioners.
101. The term Big Six refers to the largest public accounting firms. (In earlier time
periods, the reference was to Big Eight.) Currently, the Big Six firms are Arthur
Anderson LLP, Coopers & Lybrand LLP, Deloitte & Touche LLP, Ernst & Young
LLP, KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, and Price Waterhouse LLP. See Rick Telberg, Big 6
Race Into LLPs, Acc't Today, Aug. 8, 1994, at 1; see also The Editors Look Back at a
Busy and Active Year, The CPA J., Dec. 1994, at 20 (discussing recent LLP status of
Big Six firms).
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and mid-sized firms more often than against the large, national firms
appear valid.'02
2. Average Number of Audits Under Question"°
In Rule 2(e) orders involving auditors, the SEC questioned an aver-
age of 2.07 audits performed by the auditor(s) or the audit firm under
question. °4 While it may be reasonable for an auditor to misjudge an
error once, repeated errors in judgment are unreasonable. Generally,
the SEC has stronger support for a finding of improper professional
conduct when GAAS violations occurred in several different audits.
3. Audit Client'0 5
No particular type of client was the primary focus of Rule 2(e) pro-
ceedings. While a wide variety of industries were audited in the deci-
sions surveyed, broker-dealer and holding company audits were seen
most often, although each constituted less than 10% of the actions.
This diversity indicates that the complexity of accounting issues associ-
ated with individual businesses must be considered in determining
whether an auditor has met the proposed reasonable auditor standard.
4. Related Securities Violations'
0 6
Thirty-one percent of the cases surveyed included related actions
against the auditor subject to the consent order. In 13% of all cases,
the auditor also was charged with violating a section of Rule 2(e)
other than 2(e)(1)(ii).10 7 Usually, the related action pertained to aid-
ing and abetting, or primarily violating, the securities laws."0 "
Although these related violations are separately actionable under
102. See, e.g., Nina Easton, Bias for Big Eight Seen in Enforcement, Legal Tines,
Feb. 25, 1985, at 1. See also infra part II.B.1 (providing reasons why Big Six auditors
are less likely to be subjected to Rule 2(e) actions).
103. Symbols bl-el in the Appendix represent the number of audits addressed by
the Rule 2(e) action in the cases surveyed.
104. The number of audits refers to the number of separate issuances of audited
financial statements.
105. Symbols j-u in the Appendix represent the type of business that the audited
company practiced in the cases surveyed.
106. Symbols v-w in the Appendix represent related actions in the cases surveyed.
107. In one case, there was a charge under Rule 2(e)(1)(i) for lacking the requsite
qualifications to represent others. In seven cases there were charges under Rule
2(e)(1)(iii) for willfully violating, or aiding and abetting the violation of, the federal
securities laws. Further, in two cases, auditors were temporarily suspended after be-
ing permanently enjoined for violating, or found by a court to have violated or aided
and abetted the violation of, the federal securities laws. Finally, in 13 cases, the con-
sent order referred to other securities violations imposed upon the auditor, such as
previous injunctions against violation of Rule 10(b)(5) of the Exchange Act. See
Appendix.
108. See, e.g., In re Fox, Exchange Act Release No. 34,740, 57 SEC Dock. 1746,
1747 (Sept. 28, 1994); In re Briggs, 50 S.E.C. 984, 985 (May 6, 1992); In re Haney,
Securities Act Release No. 6687, 37 SEC Dock. 663, 663 (Jan. 28, 1987).
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Rule 2(e)(1)(iii), they provide further support for the Commission's
allegation that the auditor or firm met the standard of improper pro-
fessional conduct under Rule 2(e)(1)(ii) in that a reasonable audi-
tor'0 9 would not commit securities violations in connection with an
audit. 110
Fifty-seven percent of the decisions referred to related actions
against the audit client or officers thereof. In an additional 21%, an
action against another auditor or the respondent's audit firm was
brought separately. These statistics demonstrate the pervasiveness of
the wrongful activity-within both the accounting firm and the au-
dited company-in many Rule 2(e) cases.
5. Most Frequently Alleged Violations"'
Virtually all of the cases surveyed included a description of viola-
tions of GAAS and departures from GAAP in the audited financial
statements." 2 The SEC most frequently alleged failure to gather suf-
ficient competent evidential matter and lack of due care" 3-in 83%
and 64% of the cases, respectively. Other frequently alleged GAAS
violations included (1) relying on management without gathering suf-
ficient corroborating evidence-alleged in 45% of the cases; (2) fail-
ure to maintain the proper level of professional skepticism-36%; (3)
failure to plan the audit adequately or to consider risk-33%; (4) fail-
ure to follow reporting standards-25%; (5) failure to recognize or
audit related party transactions adequately-23%; (6) failure to rec-
109. See infra part IV (setting forth reasonable auditor standard).
110. Of course, related actions cannot be the only basis for a Rule 2(e)(1)(ii) viola-
tion-otherwise the violation would fall under Rule 2(e)(1)(iii).
111. Symbols fl-yl in the Appendix represent GAAS Standards that allegedly were
not complied with in the cases surveyed.
112. In the few cases where the Commission merely alleged that the auditor had
violated GAAS and the audited financial statements did not comport with GAAP,
without detailing which specific GAAS standards were violated, the auditor previ-
ously had consented to violations of the securities laws. See In re Briggs, 50 S.E.C.
984, 985 (May 6, 1992); In re Haney, Securities Act Release No. 6687, 37 SEC Dock.
663, 663 (Jan. 28, 1987).
113. Lack of due professional care appeared to be a "catch-all" provision in some
cases. See, e.g., In re Shook, Exchange Act Release No. 34,096, 56 SEC Dock. 2056,
2059 (May 23, 1994) (noting that the auditor failed to exercise due professional care
by putting the audit report on false and misleading letterhead and failing to: (1) read
the client's Form 8-K filing with the SEC, (2) contact the predecessor auditor, and (3)
obtain sufficient competent evidential matter); In re Schiemann, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 32,983, 55 SEC Dock. 225, 228-29 (Sept. 29, 1993) (noting that the auditor
failed to exercise due professional care by failing to: (1) properly plan the audits and
consider risk, (2) obtain sufficient competent evidential matter, (3) disclaim the opin-
ion on the financial statements, (4) adequately consider documentary evidence, and
(5) maintain in the workpapers representation letters that the auditor claimed to have
obtained during the course of the audit). In a separate opinion in Checkosky v. SEC,
one judge claimed that "stating that an auditor violated this generally accepted audit-
ing standard [due professional care] is the same as stating that the auditor acted negli-
gently." 23 F3d 452, 480-81 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Randolph, J.).
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ognize or react properly to "red flags"" 4 -19%; and (7) inadequate
supervision-17%. Interestingly, lack of independence, which former
Commissioner Karmel argues is the only proper ground for sanction-
ing a professional under Rule 2(e)," 5 was alleged in only 13% of the
surveyed cases.
The SEC rarely referred to an auditor's judgment,"16 yet, the role of
professional judgment is crucial in most GAAS violations. Indeed,
where the auditor does not act willfully, errors in judgment are the
cause of GAAS violations. To determine whether conduct constitutes
improper professional conduct, the SEC must consider whether the
auditor's professional judgment was clearly erroneous, taking into ac-
count the auditor's permissible range of professional judgment for
each alleged violation.
6. Sanctions Under Rule 2(e) 117
In 21% of the orders, the SEC permanently denied the auditor the
privilege of practicing or appearing before it. In these cases, the audi-
tor could apply, probably unsuccessfully," 8 for reinstatement at any
time." 9 In 55% of the cases, the SEC permanently denied the audi-
tor's privileges, but provided the auditor with an opportunity to reap-
ply after a specific amount of time.120 The amount of time specified
before reapplication ranged from six months to five years. In 28% of
the orders, the SEC issued a temporary suspension, ranging from sixty
days to five years; the average temporary suspension lasted 2.05 years.
When the SEC issued a temporary suspension or permanent denial
114. For example, in In re Gaede, the Commission provided examples of "circum-
stances creating 'red flags' that may lead an auditor to question whether material
errors or possible irregularities exist." 50 S.E.C. 371, 381 (Sept. 26, 1990). These cir-
cumstances included: "differences between a control account and its supporting sub-
sidiary records; the completion of unusual transactions at or near year-end; and
transactions not supported by proper documentation." Id. (citing AU § 327.08).
115. See Karmel, supra note 52, at 3.
116. Auditor judgment refers to the limited flexibility, based on work performed
and professional experience, that the auditor has in making a-conclusion. See infra
part IV.A.1.
117. Symbols a2-12 in the Appendix represent sanctions against auditors in the
cases surveyed.
118. See infra note 120.
119. Pursuant to Rule 2(e)(4)(i), "An application for reinstatement of a person per-
manently suspended or disqualified" under Rule 2(e)(1)(ii) for improper professional
conduct "may be made at any time, and the applicant may, in the Commission's dis-
cretion, be afforded a hearing; however, the suspension or disqualification shall con-
tinue unless and until the applicant has been reinstated by the Commission for good
cause shown." 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(4)(i) (1994).
120. Because the Commission can use its discretion in affording an auditor a hear-
ing, one could argue that specifying an amount of time before an auditor can reapply
is a stricter sanction than mere permanent denial. On the other hand, it would seem
that the Commission likely would afford an auditor a hearing soon after the expira-
tion of this specified time period, where, if an auditor was permanently denied privi-
leges, the SEC might never grant that auditor a hearing.
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qualified by a period of time before reapplication, the order often
specified standards that the auditor would be required to meet before
privileges would be reinstated.'21 Finally, in 23% of the cases, the
Commission censured"2 the auditor. Some censures were combined
with a suspension. 23
B. Correlation Between Respondent Criteria, Violations
and Sanctions
Among the Rule 2(e) cases, the survey compares (1) sanctions
based on respondent criteria and (2) the number and type of GAAS
violations occurring at each degree of sanction. Standing alone, the
numbers and trends shown in this survey should not be considered
dispositive: The severity of alleged GAAS violations varies in each
case. Accordingly, the egregiousness and pervasiveness of each viola-
tion must be considered on a case-by-case basis in judicial and admin-
istrative orders of sanctions.
It appears that the Commission focuses on the level of culpability at
the sanctions stage of the proceedings, that is, only after indepen-
dently determining that a violation of Rule 2(e) has occurred. When
there is a clear violation of GAAS or a departure from GAAP, a neg-
ligent level of culpability-at a minimum-is implicit in finding a vio-
lation124 When an auditor's decision, however, is not clearly
erroneous due to the deference allowed for the auditor's range of pro-
fessional judgment, the Commission bluntly states that GAAS and
121. See supra note 38.
122. A censure is defined as "an official reprimand." Black's Law Dictionary 224
(6th ed. 1990). As a practical matter, the SEC will consider the sanction in any subse-
quent action(s) against the auditor, and the censure will remain a "black mark" on the
auditor's employment record.
123. The percentages total more that 100% because in some cases, the auditor was
only censured, while in others, the auditor was sanctioned in addition to being cen-
sured. Further, in some cases, more than one auditor was included in the action, with
each auditor receiving different sanctions.
124. For example, under AU § 331.12:
When the independent auditor has not satisfied himself as to inventories in
the possession of the client through the procedures described... [in other
areas of this auditing standard], tests of the accounting records alone will not
be sufficient for him to become satisfied as to quantities; it will always be
necessary for the auditor to make, or observe, some physical counts of the
inventory and apply appropriate tests of intervening transactions. This
should be coupled with inspection of the records of any client's counts and
procedures relating to the physical inventory on which the balance-sheet in-
ventory is based.
AICPA, supra note 18, AU § 331.12 (emphasis added). If, under these circumstances,
the auditor does not make any physical counts of inventory, the decision to forego
counts will be clearly erroneous, and therefore outside the protected range of judg-
ment under the proposed reasonable auditor standard. The auditor's decision to act
in direct contradiction of this standard, or failure to recognize that the standard ap-
plies to him or her, is, at a minimum, negligent.
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GAAP violations exist without reviewing the auditor's mental state. 25
Instead, the culpability determination is made later, when ascertaining
sanctions. 26
1. Comparison of Sanctions Imposed on Auditors According to the
Size of the Audit Firm
The Commission appears to impose lighter sentences on Big Six
firms as compared to solo practitioners and small- or medium-sized
firms. In 53 % of the cases involving Big Six firms, the order called for
a censure. 127 Seventy-one percent of the orders to Big Six firms issued
temporary suspensions, averaging 2.6 years. The SEC permanently
denied Big Six auditors their privileges in 24% of these cases and gave
auditors permission to reapply for privileges after an average of 2.65
years. To date, in Rule 2(e)(1)(ii) cases, the SEC has never perma-
nently denied an auditor working in a Big Six firm privileges without
also giving permission to reapply after a specified period of time.
In comparison, the Commission never censured or temporarily sus-
pended solo practitioners. Solo practitioners were permanently de-
nied privileges of practicing or appearing before the Commission in
43% of these cases. These auditors were permanently denied privi-
leges in 57% of the cases, but were given a specific amount of time
before reapplying for their privileges. The amount of time before re-
application was permitted averaged 3.4 years.
Finally, 23% of the surveyed Rule 2(e) decisions regarding small-
and medium-sized firms called for censures; 37% issued temporary
suspensions, averaging 1.4 years; 77% ordered permanent denials with
an average of 3.2 years before reapplication; and 13% issued perma-
nent denials."z
These figures do not necessarily indicate that the SEC affords pref-
erential treatment to Big Six firms. National firms tend to devote sub-
stantial sums of money to training their employees. 29 Furthermore,
they often have inter-office reviews and peer reviews by outside firms
125. See In re Lamirato, Exchange Act Release No. 33,660, 56 SEC Dock. 294 (Feb.
23, 1994); In re Lehman, 50 S.E.C. 389 (Sept. 28, 1990); In re Mercer, 50 S.E.C. 8
(Apr. 13, 1989).
126. The effect of this process on the reasonable auditor standard proposed herein
is discussed in part IV.A. This Note proposes that the culpability inquiry should be
made initially, when determining whether a violation occurred, and then should be
referred to a second time when ascertaining appropriate sanctions. See infra part
IV.A.
127. Two cases provided for a censure alone. The remaining 15 cases provided for a
censure in addition to another sanction. See Appendix.
128. If each auditor or firm in the orders is counted as a separate case, the statistics
are altered as follows: the SEC issued censures in 18% of the cases, temporary sus-
pensions in 28%, permanent denials with permission to reapply after a specified pe-
riod in 59%, and permanent denials in 10%.
129. Easton, supra note 102, at 1 (citing Victor M. Earle III, general counsel of
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.).
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that protect against misconduct by employees. Many small firms and
solo practitioners do not participate in such reviews. 30
Due to limited training and review, small firms' and solo practition-
ers' violations tend to be more serious. Other factors also contribute
to the egregiousness of these violations. Primarily, these firms and
practitioners can face greater economic pressures because each audit
client most likely represents a substantial portion of their income.131
Furthermore, small firms and solo practitioners can choose to sacrifice
their reputations as "strict, by the book" auditors in return for gaining
or maintaining more clients. These statistics support the proposition
that additional training and review, coupled with a desire to preserve
or gain a favorable reputation, make findings of improper professional
conduct less likely.
2. Comparisons of Violations by Degree of Sanction
Few trends emerged from a comparison of the severity of sanc-
tions132 with the behavior sufficient to constitute improper profes-
sional conduct. The egregiousness of the offense and the
circumstances surrounding the audit, rather than the particular audit-
ing standard that was violated, properly appeared to be the primary
factors in determining appropriate Rule 2(e) sanctions. Thus, the
number and types of violations forming the basis for the degree of
sanctions imposed were similar.
One trend did become evident, however, where the SEC held that
the auditor lacked independence. In these cases, the minimum sanc-
tion imposed was a temporary suspension of ten years from appearing
or practicing before the Commission as an independent auditor and
five years as a preparer or reviewer of financial statements required to
be filed with the Commission. 133 More often, the SEC permanently
denied these auditors their privileges to appear before the Commis-
sion.'3' These cases demonstrate the Commission's concern with the
independence of auditors.13 1
130. Id
131. Id.
132. See supra note 33 for a listing of the degrees of sanctions.
133. See In re Iommazzo, Exchange Act Release No. 31,726, 53 SEC Dock. 473
(Jan. 12, 1993) (suspending accountant as an auditor for 10 years and as a preparer of
financial statements for five years).
134. See, eg., In re Goldstein, Exchange Act Release No. 34,641, 57 SEC Dock.
1419, 1421 (Sept. 6,1994) (ordering permanent denial without specific amount of time
to reapply); In re Rider, Exchange Act Release No. 33,982, 56 SEC Dock. 1594, 1597
(Apr. 29, 1994) (same); In re Woodside, 50 S.E.C. 76, 83 (Aug. 21, 1989) (ordering
permanent denial with permission to reapply after three years).
135. The Supreme Court has addressed the importance of an auditor's
independence:
By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corporation's finan-
cial status, the independent auditor assumes a public responsibility tran-
scending any employment relationship with the client. The independent
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C. The Survey Results Indicate the Need for a Reasonable
Auditor Standard
The survey results evidence the need for a more precise explanation
of Rule 2(e)'s improper professional conduct standard. In determin-
ing whether a Rule 2(e) violation has occurred, the SEC must con-
sider factors such as the auditor's level of experience, the number of
audits involved, the client's type of business, specific GAAS viola-
tions, and departures from GAAP. The reasonable auditor standard
proposed herein considers each of these factors.
III. EXAMPLES OF ExcEssIvE AGGRESSION BY THE COMMISSION
Many critics have accused the Commission of being too aggressive
in bringing Rule 2(e) proceedings.136 Use of the proposed reasonable
auditor standard would help alleviate unduly aggressive enforcement
of Rule 2(e). 137
A. Auditors Are Justifiably Concerned About Rule 2(e) Liability
One administrative law judge asserted that auditors who "merely
made an error of judgment or had been careless" are unlikely targets
for professional discipline.138 The Commission, however, has occa-
sionally subjected auditors to professional discipline for such ques-
tionable behavior. In fact, "there appears to be an increasing
aggressiveness by the [SEC] staff in instituting" Rule 2(e) cases
against accountants who err in professional judgment. 139 Even the
SEC's Chairman, Arthur Levitt, agrees that the accounting profession
public accountant performing this special function owes ultimate allegiance
to the corporation's creditors and stockholders, as well as to the investing
public. This "public watchdog" function demands that the accountant main-
tain total independence from the client at all times and requires complete
fidelity to the public trust.
United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984). This Court also
recognized that it is "not enough that financial statements be accurate; the public
must also perceive them as being accurate." ItL at 819 n.15.
In March 1994, the SEC prepared a report for Congress regarding auditor indepen-
dence, where its Office of the Chief Accountant declined to recommend additional
legislation or Commission rules regarding auditor independence. Office of the Chief
Accountant, Staff Report on Auditor Independence 1 (March 1994) (on file with the
Fordham Law Review). The Commission determined that existing Commission rules,
interpretations, and enforcement efforts adequately protect investors against auditors
who lack independence. Id.
136. See infra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
137. See infra part IV (proposing a reasonable auditor standard).
138. In re Potts, Initial Decision Release No. 48, 56 SEC Dock. 1980, 2000 (May 19,
1994).
139. Karmel, supra note 52, at 3. While there were only 5 Rule 2(e) decisions re-
garding improper professional conduct in the SEC's fiscal year 1990 (October 1, 1989,
through September 30, 1990) and 4 in fiscal 1991, there were 10 decisions in fiscal
1992, 11 in fiscal 1993, and 17 in fiscal 1994. See Appendix.
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is "justifiably concerned about increased litigation and unlimitedliability.' ' 14°
Many auditors settle cases rather than endure lengthy, expensive
trials before administrative law judges, where they likely will lose.
One author reasons:
The combined effect of vague standards of culpability, favorable
legal standards of [the SEC's] own adoption, and the power to de-
prive professionals temporarily or permanently of what to many is
the most vital part of their professional activity and livelihood, is a
clear enough explanation of why accountants have been willing to
negotiate consent settlements on terms that appear questionable in
terms of the SEC's authority.141
Thus, because of the grave effect Rule 2(e) liability can have on an
auditor's career, the Rule has a chilling effect-deterring auditors
from appearing before the Commission.142 The proposed reasonable
auditor standard provides an auditor with comfort that his or her ac-
tions will not be looked upon too harshly.
B. Examples of Overzealous Enforcement of Rule 2(e)
In In re Seidman & Seidman,143 an accounting firm's audit of
Chronar Corporation, a research and development firm, resulted in
Rule 2(e) proceedings.1'" The firm consented to a censure in an "Or-
der Imposing Remedial Sanctions" without admitting or denying the
SEC's allegations that Chronar's improper recognition of revenue on
two transactions rendered its financial statements false and
misleading. 45
In one of the transactions, Chronar agreed to sell equipment, ma-
chinery, and technology to Interplastica, S.A., a Swiss engineering and
trading concern." Chronar recognized $1.8 million in revenue after
140. SEC Chairman Promises More Investor Protection, J. Acct., Dec. 1994, at 11
(emphasis added) (speaking at the Financial Executives Institute's 63rd annual con-
ference). The Chairman continued, "While I am sympathetic to [the accounting pro-
fession's] concerns, I believe the interests of investors must be balanced against the
interests of accountants who have engaged in irresponsible and sometimes fraudulent
behavior." Id.
141. Gormley, supra note 30, [ 13.04[1][b], at 13-41 to 13-42.
142. Accounting literature has cautioned auditors "to practice with one eye on
Rule 2(e) decisions, [because] ... the SEC and its staff relish the role of 'Monday
morning quarterback' in determining compliance with GAAS and GAAP." Quinton
F. Seamons, Elusive Meaning of SEC Rule Debated in Coopers Case" Securities and
Exchange Commission, Coopers & Lybrand versus Savin Corp., Acct. Today, Oct. 24,
1994, at 13.
143. 48 S.E.C. 310 (Oct. 10, 1985).
144. Id.; see also Haft, supra note 1, § 8.03, at 8-19 to 8-20 (also describing Seidman
& Seidman as an example of a "settled Rule 2(e) proceeding[ ] that involved ... close
(and honest) professional judgment[ ] by the accountants").
145. 48 S.E.C. at 310, 332.
146. Id. at 312-13.
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delivering technical materials to Interplastica.147 The SEC questioned
the recognition of this amount during the period between the signing
of the agreement on March 26, 1983, and the final payment under the
agreement on July 5, 1984. In issuing an opinion on Chronar's finan-
cial statements for the fiscal year ended March 31, 1983, and con-
senting to the reissuance of its unqualified opinion on February 17,
1984, the auditors reviewed the following support for this revenue: (1)
the Buy/Sell Agreement;"4  (2) a representation from Chronar's
outside (United States) law firm that the transaction would be valid
under United States law;"49 (3) an oral representation from Interplas-
tica's director that the $1.8 million payment was related to the transfer
of technology alone;150 (4) a telex from Interplastica's Swiss attorney
confirming that the payment was for the "delivery of technical know
how" and the performance bond was independent of such payment;'
5
'
(5) a letter from Interplastica including the information set forth in
their attorney's telex;" 2 (6) a $500,000 wire payment from Interplas-
tica; 153 (7) reports prepared by a government agency and Chronar's
internal engineers supporting that "Chronar had the ability to meet
the contract's performance criteria on an overall production basis;'
154
and (8) a modified Interplastica agreement which specifically set forth
the portion of the agreement pertaining to the technology transfer for
$1.8 million (but added a provision regarding collection of the $1.3
million not yet paid to Chronar).155 Despite the overwhelming evi-
dence gathered, the SEC claimed that Seidman should not have al-
lowed Chronar to recognize the revenue.'5 6
In Seidman & Seidman, the SEC did not respect adequately the au-
ditors' professional judgment that they had gathered a sufficient
amount of evidence. Rather, the Commission weakly concluded that
"the firm, while exercising its judgment, failed to adequately reconcile
conflicting evidence which was available to it and which was contained
in the documents obtained by it.' 57 In doing so, the SEC failed to
acknowledge Statements on Auditing Standards ("AU") Section
326.20, which provides that "[i]n the great majority of cases, the audi-
147. Id. at 315.
148. 1& at 317.
149. Id. at 318.
150. Id at 318 n.11.
151. Id. at 318.
152. Id. at 320.
153. Id
154. Id.
155. Id at 321.
156. The SEC believed that (1) it was uncertain that Chronar could meet its obliga-
tions under the performance bond; (2) it was unclear that the obligations of Chronar
under the performance bond were independent of the technology transfer; and (3) it
was not certain that the $1.8 million was for the transfer of technology alone. Id. at
325-28.
157. Id at 329.
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tor finds it necessary to rely on evidence that is persuasive rather than
convincing,""15 and AU Section 326.21, which recognizes the possible
impact of time and cost constraints. 59 The evidence gathered here
was persuasive by all reasonable standards. Under a reasonable audi-
tor standard, greater weight would have been placed on the auditors'
professional judgment-which was not clearly erroneous'6 here. Be-
cause reasonable auditors could differ, the auditors in this case would
have been given the benefit of the doubt, and their conduct would not
have been considered improper.
The Commission also determined that Seidman & Seidman failed to
document completely its reconsideration of the transaction during
subsequent events procedures,' 6 ' thereby violating the firm's guide-
lines regarding documentation 62 An auditor's failure to follow his or
her firm's auditing guidelines, however, should not necessarily be
equated with improper professional conduct. 63
In In re Coopers & Lybrand and Cohen,16' auditors consented to
perhaps the most unsupported Rule 2(e) settlement. The action re-
lated to the firm's audit of Digilog, a public company that developed,
manufactured, and sold electronic equipment. 65 During the years for
which audited financial statements were under scrutiny, Digilog had
entered into an agreement with another company, DBS, whereby
DBS would market microcomputer systems containing Digilog
158. AICPA, supra note 18, AU § 326.20.
159. Id AU § 326.21. In full, this section provides:
An auditor typically works within economic limits; his opinion, to be eco-
nomically useful, must be formed within a reasonable length of time and at
reasonable costs. The auditor must decide, again exercising professional
judgment, whether the evidential matter available to him within the limits of
time and cost is sufficient to justify expression of an opinion.
Id AU § 326.22 continues discussing this principle, noting, "As a guiding rule, there
should be a rational relationship between the cost of obtaining evidence and the use-
fulness of the information obtained." Alone, the "difficulty and expense involved in
testing a particular item is not ... a valid basis for omitting the test." Id. AU § 326.22
160. Clearly erroneous auditing refers to audit conclusions that are "unsupported
by substantial evidence, or contrary to [the] clear weight of evidence, or induced by
an erroneous view" of the applicable auditing andlor accounting standards. See
Black's Law Dictionary 251 (6th ed. 1990).
161. "An independent auditor's report ordinarily is issued in connection with his-
torical financial statements that purport to present financial position at a stated date
and results of operations and cash flows for a period ended on that date." AICPA,
supra note 18, AU § 560.01. Subsequent events procedures refer to testing done on
"events or transactions [that] occur subsequent to the balance[ ]sheet date, but prior
to the issuance of the financial statements and auditor's report, [and] have a material
effect on the financial statements and therefore require adjustment or disclosure in
the statements." ML
162. In re Seidman & Seidman, 48 S.E.C. 310, 330 & n.18. (Oct. 10, 1985).
163. See infra note 218 and accompanying text.
164. 48 S.E.C. 49 (Nov. 27, 1984).
165. Id at 49-50.
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microcomputers. 166 The auditors opined that consolidation of Digilog
and DBS financial statements was not required.167
Curiously, the SEC found neither a violation of GAAS nor any ac-
counting that did not comply with GAAP. More curiously, the settle-
ment neither sanctioned the firm or engagement partner nor
mandated any corrective action. 168 Rather, the Commission opined
that "in order to make the most meaningful presentation, Digilog's
financial statements.., should have been consolidated with those of
DBS."'1 69 The following year, an attorney at the Annual Securities
Regulation Institute claimed that the Commission was only reciting
" 'what anyone would know from reading the financial statements'"
and giving its view that it would have preferred that Digilog's financial
statements had been consolidated. 7 ° Some considered this case evi-
dence of the SEC's desire to police accounting firms strictly, but con-
tended that the timing of the settlement indicated that the
Commission's case was not very strong.' 7' Under a reasonable audi-
tor standard, the auditor's range of judgment regarding financial state-
ment presentation would have been given greater consideration, and
these auditors probably would not have been subject to a Rule 2(e)
action.
IV. PROPOSAL: THE REASONABLE AUDITOR STANDARD
The results of the survey and the examples of aggressive SEC en-
forcement of Rule 2(e) indicate the need for a reasonable auditor
standard. Notably:
"The fundamental and primary responsibility for the accuracy of in-
formation filed with the Commission and disseminated among the
investors rests upon [the audited company's] management. Man-
agement does not discharge its obligations in this respect by the em-
ployment of independent public accountants, however reputable.
Accountants' certificates are required not as a substitute for man-
agement's accounting of its stewardship, but as a check upon the
accounting.' 172
166. Id. at 51.
167. Id. at 53.
168. SEC, C&L Settle Consolidation Dispute; No Sanctions Imposed on Firm, Part-
ner, 16 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 48, at 1936 (Dec. 7, 1984). The settlement was
particularly unusual because it "neither sanction[ed] the respondents nor mandate[d]
any corrective action." Id.
169. In re Coopers & Lybrand, 48 S.E.C. 49, 57 (Nov. 27, 1984).
170. SEC Enforcement, Financial Services, Accounting Issues Dominate SRI Meet-
ing, 17 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 210 (Feb. 1, 1985) (quoting Arthur F.
Mathews, attorney at Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering in Washington, D.C.).
171. Easton, supra note 102, at 1.
172. AICPA, supra note 18, AU § 711.01 (quoting In re Interstate Hosiery Mills,
Inc., 4 S.E.C. 721 (Mar. 18, 1939)).
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Management's primary responsibility for the accuracy of information
fied with the SEC, however, does not eliminate an auditor's responsi-
bilities. 73 Although a client may have misled or defrauded its audi-
tor, the client's conduct will not shield the auditor from responsibility
where the audit is materially defective. 74 Competent and ethical au-
ditors are a crucial requirement in ensuring the reliability of the dis-
closure process.'7 Thus, it is imperative that the Commission adopt a
specific standard to police auditing conduct and to lend predictability
to the Rule 2(e) process.
A. Considerations to be Reflected in the Proposed Standard
The Commission must apply a reasonable auditor standard that re-
quires, at a minimum, proof that the auditor violated GAAS or misin-
terpreted GAAP in the course of the audit to find improper
professional conduct under Rule 2(e). 176 The Ninth Circuit has explic-
itly approved the Commission's holding that violations of GAAS and
misinterpretations of GAAP constitute improper professional con-
duct.'7 7 Administrative decisions support the same conclusion.1 78
As previously discussed, the Commission rarely discusses the level
of culpability in determining whether an auditor has violated Rule
2(e). 79 Instead, the Commission appears to focus on culpability only
after liability has been determined and sanctions are at issue. There
are two possible explanations for the SEC's decision to delay consid-
173. "The auditor has an overriding duty to the investing public not to represent
that a financial statement is presented in conformity with [GAAP] if it is not." Check-
osky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Reynolds, J., concurring in part, dis-
senting in part) (citing Code of Professional Conduct, Rules 202, 203, 301).
174. In re Smith, Exchange Act Release No. 33,963,56 SEC Dock. 1514, 1524 (Apr.
26, 1994); In re Touche Ross & Co., Accounting Series Release No. 153, [1937-82
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 72,175, at 62,356-57 (Feb. 25, 1974). See
also In re Ernst & Whinney, Initial Decision Release No. 5, 47 SEC Dock. 93, 123(June 28, 1990) (noting that "fact that auditors are deliberately deceived by manage-
ment may be viewed as a mitigating factor, particularly in assessing a sanction").
175. Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 581 (2d. Cir. 1979). The Second
Circuit noted, "Breaches of professional responsibility jeopardize the achievement of
the objectives of the securities laws and can inflict great damage on public investors."
I&
176. Checkosky, 23 F.3d at 456 (Silberman, J.) (noting that on remand, "at mini-
mum, the Commission must establish that petitioners misinterpreted GAAP and vio-
lated GAAS in the course of their audits").
177. Davy v. SEC, 792 F.2d 1418, 1422 (9th Cir. 1986).
178. In re Haskins and Sells, Accounting Series Release No. 73, [1937-82 Transfer
Binder] 72,092, at 62,197 (Oct. 30, 1952). More recent settlements confirm this
view. See In re Huss, Exchange Act Release No. 34,414, 57 SEC Dock. 519, 520-22
(July 21, 1994); In re Venezia, Exchange Act Release No. 33,961, 56 SEC Dock. 1505,
1507 (Apr. 25, 1994); In re Jenson, Exchange Act Release No. 33,696, 56 SEC Dock.
386, 389 (Mar. 1, 1994). But see Downing & Miller, supra note 55, at 784 n.43 ("In
certain 2(e) proceedings it is questionable whether the Commission's contentions that
an accountant was negligent would pass muster under judicial standards of due dili-
gence and reasonable care.").
179. See supra introduction to part II.
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eration of the auditor's culpability until sanctions are being deter-
mined. First, it is possible that the SEC is concerned only with
ineffective audits and, thus, does not inquire into the process that led
to the failed results or the judgments involved therein.18 Under this
view, the Commission can determine, for example, that ABC Com-
pany's income was materially overstated and, thus, ABC's auditor
failed to fulfill his or her responsibilities. The mental state of the audi-
tor who performed the ineffective audit would be irrelevant. Under
the second, more plausible, view, a finding of negligence, at a mini-
mum, is implicit in the Commission's finding of a GAAS or GAAP
violation. This Note asserts that a finding of negligence, whether im-
plicit or explicit, gross, or willful, must be considered both in deter-
mining whether Rule 2(e) has been violated and in ascertaining the
appropriate sanction for the misconduct. This Note suggests further
considerations in determining a standard that will adequately describe
improper professional conduct.
1. Professional Judgment Underlies GAAS Requirements
The two most often-cited GAAS violations in Rule 2(e) proceed-
ings, lack of due care and lack of sufficient evidential matter,181 both
refer to the auditor's judgment. The due care standard, AU Section
230, requires that auditors exercise proper judgment."8 AU Section
326, which pertains to evidential matter, acknowledges that "[t]he
amount and kinds of evidential matter required to support an in-
formed opinion are matters for the auditor to determine in the exer-
cise of his professional judgment after a careful study of the
circumstances in the particular case."'8 3  Furthermore, AU Section
326 allows the auditor to use professional judgment to determine
"whether the evidential matter available to him within the limits of
time and cost is sufficient to justify expression of an opinion."' '
Because GAAS frequently refers to the role that professional judg-
ment plays in an auditor's performance, Rule 2(e)'s standard of im-
proper professional conduct likewise should consider professional
180. In its brief on remand in Checkosky, the SEC contends that a "mental state
need not be specified in an order for proceedings" under Rule 2(e)(1)(ii), pursuant to
Rule 6(a) of the Commission's Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.6(a) (1994), and
§ 5(b) of the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554(b) (Supp. 1993). Brief of
the Office of the Chief Accountant on Remand at 22, In re Checkosky, Admin. Proc.
File No. 3-6776 (Jan. 13, 1995) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). Instead the
SEC argues that "the degree of intent and the egregiousness of the violations deter-
mine the sanction." Id. It appears that the auditor's mental state, which encompasses
his or her range of judgment, would be most important in determining whether an
auditor meets the improper professional conduct standard.
181. See supra part II.A.5. (most frequently alleged violations).
182. AICPA, supra note 18, AU § 230.02.
183. Id AU § 326.20.
184. Id AU § 326.21.
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judgment.185 Despite GAAS' treatment of professional judgment, the
decisions in this area infrequently refer to the importance of profes-
sional discretion. One decision, In re Schulzetenberg,'" however, did
discuss the deference due to professional judgment. In discussing the
respondent's audit treatment of an inadequate receivable allowance,
the SEC noted that the auditor has "an obligation to assure that suffi-
cient information [is] obtained in order to make a reasonable judg-
ment .... [W]hile an auditor's conclusions about the reasonableness
of accounting estimates inevitably involve[ ] the exercise of judgment,
those judgments must be based on valid, carefully evaluated compe-
tent evidential matter." '187 In clarifying Rule 2(e)'s standard of im-
proper professional conduct, the SEC should return to its reasoning in
Schulzetenberg.
2. Does a Single Violation Constitute Improper
Professional Conduct?
A single error by an auditor should not necessarily be actionable
under Rule 2(e). A "single" occurrence can be defined as all errors
occurring in one audit, or each error within an audit can be counted
separately. Regardless of the definition used, the proposed reason-
able auditor standard must take into account how many GAAS and
GAAP violations occurred; while one error in judgment may be rea-
sonable, several such errors may not be reasonable. The facts and
circumstances surrounding a single error in judgment must be consid-
ered in determining whether that error meets the reasonable auditor
standard.
Auditors and commentators have argued that a single finding of im-
proper professional conduct does not "demonstrate a reasonable like-
lihood of future misconduct and therefore . . . a professional bar
[would not further] ... the legitimate purpose of protecting the integ-
rity of the Commission's own processes."'" The courts have not de-
termined whether the SEC must show "how an isolated incident of
alleged negligence presents any future threat to the public or the
185. Some within the Commission see Rule 2(e) as a method of engaging in profes-
sional standard setting. See supra text accompanying note 5. Additionally, courts look
to GAAS in determining whether an auditor has engaged in improper professional
conduct. See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
186. 49 S.E.C. 916 (Sept. 23, 1988).
187. Id. at 946-47. The SEC further noted
To the extent that [the auditor] makes judgments and forms his "opinion" on
the basis of adequate evidence, he acts rationally by following a systematic
or methodical procedure; to the extent that he fails to gather "sufficient
competent evidential matter" and fails to evaluate it effectively, he acts irra-
tionally and his judgments can have little standing.
Id. at 947 n.32 (quoting R.K. Mautz & R.A. Sharaf, The Philosophy of Auditing,
American Accounting Association Monograph No. 6, at 68 (1961)).
188. Danna v. SEC, No. C-'93-4158 CW, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7256, at *9 (N.D.
Cal Feb. 8, 1994).
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Commission processes."' 9 The failure to place this burden on the
SEC when determining misconduct seems appropriate because a pos-
sibility of future misconduct is relevant in sanctioning an auditor-not
in determining misconduct. 190
3. What Level of Oversight is Necessary to Protect the
Commission's Processes?
The Commission's use of Rule 2(e) to protect its internal processes
is well-established. 191 One issue, however, remains unclear: What
minimum level of conduct harms the SEC? Several courts have con-
sidered this issue.
In Checkosky v. SEC, 9 the petitioners argued that the Commis-
sion's authority did not extend to disciplining professionals for negli-
gence. 193 They reasoned:
If the purpose of Rule 2(e) is to protect the integrity of administra-
tive processes, then sanctions for improper professional conduct
under 2(e)(1)(ii) are permissible only to the extent that they pre-
189. Id at *10. Similar arguments are raised when the SEC seeks injunctions for
securities violations. Before awarding injunctive relief, courts consider the totality of
the circumstances; one relevant factor included in this "whole picture" is the isolated
or repeated nature of the violations. SEC v. Youmans, 729 F.2d 413, 415 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1034 (1984). Other relevant factors include the egregiousness of
the violations; the degree of culpability; the sincerity of the defendant's assurances, if
any, against future violations; the defendant's recognition of the wrongfulness of his
conduct; the likelihood that the defendant's occupation will present opportunities for
future violations; and the defendant's age or health. Id. To adequately protect the
public, the court must determine whether the infraction is likely to recur. Steadman v.
SEC, 603 F.2d 1126, 1140 (5th Cir. 1979).
190. Therefore, when ascertaining the appropriate sanction, the SEC should have
the burden of proving whether an auditor would threaten the securities market in the
future.
191. See supra part I.B.1. The administrative courts have recognized this as well.
In In re Ernst & Whinney, the administrative law judge expounded:
The Commission relies very heavily on the competence and integrity of the
independent auditors who practice before it in order to fulfill its statutory
responsibilities. This reliance is in recognition of the unique responsibility
independent auditors have and their role in preserving the integrity of the
securities markets. The independent auditor assumes a public responsibility
transcending any employment relationship with the client, and breaches of
professional responsibility jeopardize the achievement of the objectives of
the securities laws and can inflict great damage on public investors.
Initial Decision Release No. 5, 47 SEC Dock. 93, 126 (June 28, 1990) (citations omit-
ted). Further, in In re Arthur Andersen & Co., the Commission declared:
The objectives of the securities laws can only be achieved when those profes-
sionals who practice before the Commission... act in a manner consistent
with their responsibilities. Professionals involved in the disclosure process
are ... representatives of the investing public served by the Commission,
and, [thus] ... their dealings with the Commission ... must be permeated
with candor and full disclosure.
45 S.E.C. 601, 609 (July 8, 1974).
192. 23 F.3d 452 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (per curiam).
193. Id at 456 (Silberman, J.).
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vent the disruption of proceedings. Punishment for mere negli-
gence ... extends beyond this realm of protective discipline into
general regulatory authority over a professional's work.'94
Although the Commission did not clearly present the standard that it
had applied to the auditors in the Checkosky case, two judges filing
separate opinions urged that negligence was the proper standard, 9
while the third judge determined that the question regarding the mini-
mum level of mental culpability was not properly presented and, ac-
cordingly, did not address the issue.196
In Danna & Dentinger v. SEC,197 a Rule 2(e) action against two Big
Six auditors, a federal district court suggested that negligence was the
threshold level of culpability that harms the SEC's processes. 198 The
court determined that bad faith is not necessary to support a finding
of improper professional conduct.199 In addition, the court stated that
the Commission's authority "extends to all situations in which [the
alleged] improper professional conduct... may impair the integrity of
the Commission's processes." 200 The court noted that, in upholding
the SEC's authority under Rule 2(e), the Touche Ross201 court "did
not distinguish between intentional misconduct and negligent miscon-
duct and [its holding] was equally applicable to both."2"
In a Commission decision, In re Ernst & Whinney and Ferrante,"3
an administrative law judge held that auditors' conduct, "whether
through negligence, good faith, incompetence or ignorance, may sub-
ject accountants to [Rule 2(e)] discipline . . . in order to preserve
thereby the integrity of the Commission's processes."2"4 In support of
its conclusion, the court quoted In re Carter and Johnson:
"[W]e perceive no unfairness whatsoever in holding those profes-
sionals who practice before [the Commission] to generally recog-
nized norms of professional conduct, whether or not such norms
had previously been explicitly adopted or endorsed by the Commis-
194. Md
195. Id. at 480 (Randolph, J.); id. at 494 (Reynolds, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
196. Id. at 480 (Randolph, J.); id at 494 (Reynolds, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
197. No. C-93-4158 CW, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7256 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 1994) (rul-
ing tentatively on defendant's motion to dismiss and plaintiff's injunction).
198. See hi. at *3.
199. Id. at *11. This court partially relied on In re Checkosky, 50 S.E.C. 1180 (Aug.
26, 1992), which was later appealed and then remanded. See supra text accompanying
notes 10-14.
200. Danna, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7256, at *3-4.
201. Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979).
202. Danna v. SEC, No. C-93-4158 CV, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7256, at *4 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 8, 1994).
203. Initial Decision Release No. 5, 47 SEC Dock. 93 (June 28, 1990).
204. Id. at 123.
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sion. To do so upsets no justifiable expectations, since the profes-
sional is already subject to those norms." 20 5
The proposed reasonable auditor standard takes these "generally rec-
ognized norms of professional conduct" into account.206
B. Proposed Standard: The Reasonable Auditor
This Note urges the Commission to adopt and apply consistently a
reasonable auditor standard in Rule 2(e) proceedings. The proposed
standard reflects the results of the survey in part H and accounts for
the auditor's range of professional judgment, the circumstances under
which a single error should constitute improper professional conduct,
and the SEC's desire to protect the integrity of its processes. While
the Commission must protect its processes and the investing public,
the Commission and the public should not infringe arbitrarily upon
the right of the practicing auditor to pursue his or her livelihood. To
address these concerns, the SEC must apply the proposed reasonable
auditor standard, 0 7 which clearly establishes the boundaries of im-
proper professional conduct and provides a fair warning to practicing
auditors.20 8 As a starting point in flushing out this standard for the
auditing community, the Commission can defer to specific auditing
standards and authoritative literature. 0 9 Specifically, the Commission
205. Id. (quoting In re Carter, 47 S.E.C. 471, 508 (Feb. 28, 1981)).
206. Id
207. The Commission has used a reasonable auditor standard only sporadically,
but, when doing so, has adequately addressed the concerns of all affected by the pro-
ceeding. In In re Schoemer, for example, the reasonable auditor standard was applied
to determine that a reasonable auditor would have verified the cost of investments,
verified that the investments existed at the balance sheet date, compared confirma-
tion requests to underlying broker advices, and tested that all secunties that should
have been recorded in fact were recorded in the investment accounts-procedures
that this auditor did not perform. 50 S.E.C. 921, 926-29 (Mar. 31, 1992). The court
also referred to several AU standards in determining what conduct was reasonable.
AL; see also In re Ford, 50 S.E.C. 585, 588 (June 17, 1991) (applying the reasonable
auditor standard to determine that a reasonable auditor would have reviewed board
of directors minutes and recognized red flags that would have alerted the auditor to
substantial questions concerning management integrity-procedures which this audi-
tor did not perform).
208. This Note recognizes the difficulty in drafting and implementing a clear, con-
sistent standard that could be applied in every Rule 2(e)(1)(ii) case. The facts of each
case vary significantly, and thus the situation each auditor faces likewise differs. The
present wording of the standard has been considered unconstitutionally vague, Crane,
supra note 40, at 359-64, but it is difficult to propose a detailed flexible standard that
could be applied reasonably and sensibly to the facts and circumstances of every, or
even most, situations, considering how each differs. At the same time, the Commis-
sion would not want to set an overly restrictive standard because then auditors might
find a way to evade the standard. Thus, supplementing the proposed standard with an
interpretive release is recommended.
209. For example, the Commission, could refer to Financial Accounting Standards
Board Statements and Interpretations, relevant publications of the AICPA, account-
ing textbooks, and articles. See Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452, 472-73 & n.7 (D.C.
Cir. 1994) (Randolph, J.) (discussing what materials constitute GAAP).
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must describe the limitations on the auditor's realm of professional
judgment.21 0 Obviously, clearly erroneous violations of GAAS and
GAAP are outside this range of discretion.
The proposed reasonable auditor standard protects the auditor
when his or her professional conclusions are reasonable according to a
reasonable practitioner under the circumstances of the audit. Primar-
ily, the SEC must determine the extent to which the auditor complied
with GAAS and GAAP standards.2"1 In determining the reasonable-
ness of audit conclusions, the Commission must then consider the au-
ditor's level of experience" 2 by inquiring into the auditor's general
educational and work experience, as well as the auditor's experience
with the particular client whose audit is being questioned. Further,
under the proposed standard, the SEC must consider the level of su-
pervision given or received (which will depend upon the seniority of
the auditor in question).2 13 Additionally, the SEC must determine the
complexity of the audit issues, based upon the client's type of business
and the general business conditions facing the client at the time of the
audit.214 While a scheme to defraud the auditor must not preclude a
finding of improper professional conduct, it must be a factor in consid-
ering the reasonableness of auditor's conduct.215
This reasonable auditor standard allows the Commission to proceed
against negligent behavior,216 especially where the behavior is perva-
sive.217 While good faith should be a consideration to mitigate an au-
210. In adopting the proposed reasonable auditor standard, the SEC should specify
materiality limits to which auditors could refer when deciding whether or not to test
or disclose an item, or whether or not to propose a change thereto.
211. The reasonable auditor standard encompasses GAAS and GAAP standards.
Under the pending Dodd bill, the SEC may acquire "express statutory authority to
adopt, amend or abrogate rules pertaining to GAAS and GAAP requirements." See
Seamons, supra note 142, at 13.
212. See infra part ILA.1. (respondent criteria).
213. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
214. See supra part Il.A.3. (audit client).
215. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
216. Negligence alone could constitute improper professional conduct. But as one
judge in the Checkosky case noted:
If the Commission were to determine that an accountant's negligence is a
per se violation of Rule 2(e), it would have to consider not only the adminis-
trative burden such a position would entail but also whether it would consti-
tute a de facto substantive regulation of the profession and thus raise
questions as to the legitimacy of Rule 2(e)(1)(ii)-or at least its scope.
Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452, 459 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Silberman, J.). On remand in
Checkosky, the SEC argues that negligent failure to comply with GAAS or construe
GAAP properly constitutes improper professional conduct. Brief of the Office of the
Chief Accountant on Remand at 5-9, In re Checkosky, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-6776
(Jan. 13, 1995) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). The SEC supports its negli-
gence standard by relying on Commission precedent and state law (many states pro-
vide that a certified public accountant may be disciplined for negligent acts), as well as
findings that Rule 2(e) promotes investor confidence. kla
217. While the standard includes one-time incorrect conclusions that are egregious,
it focuses primarily upon a pattern of negligent behavior during the audit or a series
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ditor's sanction, bad faith must not be determinative of misconduct.
Furthermore, under the proposed standard, an auditor's failure to fol-
low his or her firm's auditing guidelines must not be a per se indication
of improper professional conduct.218
Under the reasonable auditor standard, a conclusion within the au-
ditor's range of professional judgment 219 must be given particular def-
erence when determining whether the auditor has violated GAAS.
Professional judgment will be an issue in many GAAS violations be-
cause, as previously discussed, GAAS standards do not always pro-
vide clear rules. Professional judgment "must be based on valid,
carefully evaluated competent evidential matter. ' 220 In addition, the
Commission must recognize that "[a]ccounting principles must be in-
terpreted" and "[j]udgments must be made about specific transac-
tions."2'' Accordingly, " 'reasonable preparers of financial statements
and auditors can disagree about those interpretations and
judgments.' "222
An SEC interpretive release is an appropriate means to disseminate
the details of the SEC's definition of improper professional con-
duct.223 The SEC's release must provide the auditing profession with
examples of situations in which errors in professional judgment would
constitute improper professional conduct. Examples easily could be
drawn from previous Rule 2(e) proceedings as well as from particu-
larly difficult issues addressed by the Office of the Chief Accountant
and the Corporate Finance Division in matters not necessarily related
to Rule 2(e) actions.224
of incorrect decisions made barely within the auditor's range of professional judg-
ment. The range of protection partially depends upon the GAAS standard at issue.
218. The Commission has used an auditor's failure to follow his or her firm's guide-
lines as a factor in determining improper professional conduct. In re Potts, Initial De-
cision Release No. 5, 56 SEC Dock. 1980, 2000 (May 19, 1994) (holding that
"concurring review partners must follow all professional and firm guidelines to avoid
charges of improper professional conduct under Rule 2(e)"); In re Childers, Exchange
Act Release No. 32,505, 54 SEC Dock. 759, 761 n.3 (June 24, 1993). It appears, how-
ever, to be an irrelevant and unfair measure of the auditor's performance, unless the
firm's standard is held to be the same or less stringent than that of the Statements on
Auditing Standards. Rather than referring to a particular firm's standards, the deci-
sions must compare a respondent's behavior directly with applicable auditing
standards.
219. This range is defined according to the standards of a reasonable practitioner.
220. In re Schulzetenberg, 49 S.E.C. 916, 946-47 (Sept. 23, 1988); see supra note 187
and accompanying text.
221. Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Randolph, J.).
222. Id (quoting Jerry Sullivan et al., Montgomery's Auditing 19 (10th ed. 1985)).
223. This Note does not attempt to reach the administrative law issue of the appro-
priate means of promulgating SEC rules.
224. For example, the SEC sanctioned auditors for their interpretations of Ac-
counting for Sales of Real Estate, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.
66 (Fn. Accounting Standards Bd. 1982) in In re Lamirato, Exchange Act Release
No. 33,660, 56 SEC Dock. 294, 295 (Feb. 23, 1994), and In re Burton, Exchange Act
Release No. 32,566, 54 SEC Dock. 949, 951-52 (July 1, 1993). These particularly com-
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Alternatively, after announcing a reasonable auditor standard and
providing general assertions regarding the auditor's range of judg-
ment, the Commission can decide to apply the reasonable auditor
standard on a case-by-case basis (starting with the Checkosky re-
mand). The Commission should follow this course only if it deter-
mines that an interpretive release would flush out the standard in a
restrictive manner. The underlying rationale of this approach is that
an overly specific standard invariably omits conduct that should be
considered a violation. Thus, an excessively restrictive standard inad-
vertently can allow would-be violators to "beat the system."
CONCLUSION
The Commission must enunciate a clear definition of improper pro-
fessional conduct either in an interpretive release or on remand in
Checkosky. - This interpretation must set forth a reasonable auditor
standard that delineates the boundaries of an auditor's judgment, de-
fines conduct that is clearly erroneous, and includes detailed examples
to which an auditor can refer. Of course, the SEC will be unable to
address all possible situations where an auditor's judgment is crucial
to fair audit conclusions. The Commission, however, is able to refer
to its experience and provide guidance in areas where an auditor is
most likely to err. A precise uniform standard will make future accu-
sations of overzealousness by the Commission staff in Rule 2(e) pro-
ceedings less likely and will balance the interests of the auditing
profession, the Commission, and the investing public.
plex standards could be reviewed by the Office of the Chief Accountant and the Cor-
porate Finance Division in unrelated matters. Nevertheless, the SEC can draw upon
those experiences in describing the reasonable auditor standard for specific audit
circumstances.
225. See supra part IV.B.
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APPENDIX
CASES USED IN THE SURVEY IN PART Two OF THIs NoTE
LEGEND OF SYMBOLS
Respondent Criteria
a Engagement Partner
b Concurring Partner
c Reviewing Partner
d Audit Manager
e Separate action against firm
f Big Six Firm
g Small- or Mid-Sized Firm
h Solo Practitioner
i Staff Accountant
Type of Business That Audited Company Practiced
j Broker/Dealer
k Business Development Company
I Communications
m Construction
n Holding Company
o Hotel
p Manufacturer
q Mining
r Natural Resources
s Sales
t Service
u Other or Unidentified
Related Action
v Against Audited Company
w Against Other Accountant or Accounting Firm in Separate
Action
Other Violations by Respondent
x Rule 2(e)(1)(i)
y Rule 2(e)(1)(iii)
z Rule 2(e)(3)
al Other Securities Violations
Number of Audits Addressed by Rule 2(e) Action
bl One
cl Two
dl Three
el More Than Three
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GAAS Standards That Allegedly Were NOT Complied With
fl Broker/Dealer Related Procedures
gl Due Care
hi Errors and Irregularities
il Expired CPA License
j1 GAAS and GAAP Violations Alone Alleged, Without Any
Specific Violations
k1 Independence
11 Internal Control Procedures
ml Perform Audit Procedures
ni Plan Audit and Consider Risk
ol Professional Skepticism
pl Red Flags
qi Related Party Transactions
rl Rely on Management Without Corroboration
sl Reporting Standards
ti Representation Letter
ul Successor Audit Procedures
vi Sufficient Competent Evidence
wl Supervision
xl Training
yi Other
Sanction
a2 Censure
b2 Temporary Suspension-Six months or less
c2 Temporary Suspension-Greater than six months, but less than
or equal to one year
d2 Temporary Suspension-Greater than one year, but less than
or equal to two years
e2 Temporary Suspension-Three years or more
f2 Permanent Denial With Specified Amount of Time to
Reapply-Less than or equal to one year
g2 Permanent Denial With Specified Amount of Time to
Reapply-Greater than one year, but less than or equal to
two years
h2 Permanent Denial With Specified Amount of Time to
Reapply-Greater than two years, but less than or equal to
three years
i2 Permanent Denial With Specified Amount of Tune to
Reapply-Four years
j2 Permanent Denial With Specified Amount of Time to
Reapply-Five years
k2 Specific Standards to be Met Upon Reapplication or When
Ability to Practice is Reinstated
12 Permanent Denial
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CASES
Davy v. SEC, 792 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1986).
h, r, al, bl, pl, rl, sl, v1, 12
In re Fox, Exchange Act Release No. 34,740, 57 SEC Dock. 1746 (Sept. 28,
1994).
d, g, u, w, z, al, bl, gl, q1, vi, 12
In re Halpern, Exchange Act Release No. 34,727, 57 SEC Dock. 1719 (Sept.
27, 1994).
a, g, 1, w, bl, gi, ml, qi, vi, yl, h2, k2
In re Goldstein, Exchange Act Release No. 34,641, 57 SEC Dock. 1419 (Sept.
6, 1994).
h, j, x, el, ii, ki, 12
(involved audits of more than one company)
In re Silvestain, Greenberg, Silvestain, and Wenner, Silvestain & Co., Ex-
change Act Release No. 34,631, 57 SEC Dock. 1398 (Sept. 2, 1994).
a, b, c, g, p, s, v, bl, gl, ml, ni, qi, sl, t1, vi, yl, a2, b2, g2, k2
In re Withers, Exchange Act Release No. 34,537, 57 SEC Dock. 1048 (Aug.
17, 1994).
a, f n, v, el, gi, ol, vi, yl, e2, k2
In re Huss and Moellenberg, Exchange Act Release No. 34,414, 57 SEC
Dock. 519 (July 21, 1994).
h, m, al, bl, ni, sl, tl, vi, wl, 12
In re Sologuren, Exchange Act Release No. 34,402, 57 SEC Dock. 494 (July
19, 1994).
h, j, el, fl, gl, 11, ni, qi, vi, 12
In re Shook, Exchange Act Release No. 34,096, 56 SEC Dock. 2056 (May 23,
1994).
h, u, bl, gl, ul, vi, yl, 12
In re Potts, Initial Decision Release No. 48, 56 SEC Dock. 1980 (May 19,
1994).
b, f, o, v, w, cl, gl, pl, rl, vi, d2
In re Rider, Exchange Act Release No. 33,982, 56 SEC Dock. 1594 (Apr. 29,
1994).
h, p, el, gl, ki, ol, rl, vi, 12
In re Smith and Reed, Exchange Act Release No. 33,963, 56 SEC Dock. 1514
(Apr. 26, 1994).
a, d, f m, v, cl, gl, n1, pl, rl, vi, f2, k2
In re Venezia, Exchange Act Release No. 33,961, 56 SEC Dock. 1505 (Apr.
25, 1994).
a, g, 1, bl, gl, vi, yl, j2, k2
In re Kappel, Exchange Act Release No. 33,955, 56 SEC Dock. 1478 (Apr.
22, 1994).
a, g, p, v, dl, gl, ni, qi, ul, vi, wl, yl, 12
In re Gotthilf, Exchange Act Release No. 33,949, 56 SEC Dock. 1398 (Apr.
21, 1994).
h, k, v, w, bl, gl, ni, ol, sl, vi, x1, h2, k2
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In re Jenson, Exchange Act Release No. 33,696, 56 SEC Dock. 386 (Mar. 1,
1994).h, l, d], gl, 11, r], vI, y], Q2, k2
In re Lamirato, Exchange Act Release No. 33,660, 56 SEC Dock. 294 (Feb.
23, 1994).
a, g, 1, dl, gl, yl, f2, k2
In re Dellinger and Henson, Exchange Act Release No. 33,296, 55 SEC
Dock. 1618 (Dec. 7, 1993).
a, d, e, g, n, bl, gl, ni, ol, vI, g2, k2
In re Schiemann, Exchange Act Release No. 32,983, 55 SEC Dock. 225 (Sept.
29, 1993).
h, u, v, z, al, cl, gl, ni, ol, rI, sl, vi, J2, k2
In re Burnes and Hemming Morse, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 32,980,
55 SEC Dock. 217 (Sept. 28, 1993).
a, e, g, A; bl, gl, ol, rl, vi, a2, g2, k2
In re Gotthilf and Haft, Exchange Act Release No. 32,969, 55 SEC Dock. 201
(Sept. 28, 1993).
h, k v, w, bl, gi, ni, ol, ri, sl, vi, wl, 12
In re Melsen, Exchange Act Release No. 32,917, 55 SEC Dock. 35 (Sept. 17,
1993).
a, f, o, v, w, cl, gi, mi, sl, vi, yl, c2
In re Tarnowsky, Exchange Act Release No. 32,635, 54 SEC Dock. 1168 (July
15, 1993).
h, n, v, bl, ki, vi, yl, g2, k2
In re Berti, Exchange Act Release No. 32,620, 54 SEC Dock. 1134 (July 13,
1993).
a, g, u, v, bl, gl, hi, nI, ol, qi, vi, a2, 12, k2
In re Burton, Exchange Act Release No. 32,566, 54 SEC Dock. 949 (July 1,
1993).
a, f, n, v, bl, gl, ol, qi, vi, yl, a2
In re Curtin and Lukenda, Exchange Act Release No. 32,519, 54 SEC Dock.
859 (June 28, 1993).
a, d, f, n, v, bl, gl, hl, rl, vi, wl, a2
In re Childers and Argy, Exchange Act Release No. 32,505, 54 SEC Dock.
759 (June 24, 1993).
a, d, f p, bl, gl, ol, vi, yl, g2, J2, k2
In re Hinkle and Konrath, Exchange Act Release No. 32,453, 54 SEC Dock.
649 (June 11, 1993).
a, d, g, j, v, cl, fl, 1i, mi, ni, rl, wl, yi, h2, k2
In re Iommazzo, Exchange Act Release No. 31,726, 53 SEC Dock. 473 (Jan.
12, 1993).
b,f u, di, ki, sl, e2
In re Andrus, Exchange Act Release No. 31,267, 52 SEC Dock. 1718 (Sept.
30, 1992).
h, u, v, bl, ni, rl, ti, vi, wl, h2, k2
In re Taylor, Exchange Act Release No. 31,244, 52 SEC Dock. 1667 (Sept. 28,
1992).
h, r, di, gl, ol, rl, vi, yl, 12
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In re Baker, Exchange Act Release No. 31,184, 52 SEC Dock. 1443 (Sept. 16,
1992).
h, t, v, w, y, cl, gl, ni, rl, sl, ul, vi, yl, 12
In re Domingues and Brimhall, 50 S.E.C. 1091 (July 30, 1992).
a, d, f, u, v, bl, n1, ol, rl, sl, tU, v1, yl, a2, c2, f2, k2
In re Epstein, Exchange Act Release No. 30,731, 51 SEC Dock. 757 (May 21,
1992).
a, g, , w, bl, fl, gl, hi, 1i, ol, qi, rl, sl, t1, vi, yl, a2, e2, h2, k2
In re Briggs, 50 S.E.C. 984 (May 6, 1992).
h, u, w, al, cl, fl, 12
In re Dougan, 50 S.E.C. 987 (May 6, 1992).
h, u, w, al, bl, fl, 12
In re Nilson, 50 S.E.C. 914 (Mar. 31, 1992).
h, r, v, bl, ki, ol, rl, vi, j2, k2
(involved audits of more than one company)
In re Schoemer and Denkensohn, 50 S.E.C. 921 (Mar. 31, 1992).
a, d, f v, bl, gl, ml, ni, vi, a2, c2, k2
In re Frederick S. Todman & Co. and Marchioni, 50 S.E.C. 770 (Nov. 4,
1991).
a, e, g, j, w, bl, fi, gl, hl, ll, ol, qi, rl, sl, ti, vi, a2, b2, k2
In re Wahl, 50 S.E.C. 742 (Sept. 30, 1991).
h, j, v, y, al, cl, ii, ki, g2, k2
In re Anchel, 50 S.E.C. 686 (Aug. 29, 1991).
a, g, u, v, el, gi, hl, pl, vi, yl, i2, k2
(involved audits of more than one company)
In re Greenspan, 50 S.E.C. 672 (Aug. 26, 1991).
a, g, t, v, w, y, al, cl, gl, ki, ni, pl, ul, vi, 12
In re Ford, 50 S.E.C. 585 (June 17, 1991).h, u, v, bl, k1, 11, n1, pl, Ai i2, k2
In re Lehman, 50 S.E.C. 389 (Sept. 28, 1990).
a, g, r, bl, gl, vi, yl, g2, k2
In re Gaede and Richards, 50 S.E.C. 371 (Sept. 26, 1990).
a, f, u, v, bl, gl, ml, ol, pl, rl, v, a2, b2
In re McCarley and Keenan, 50 S.E.C. 272 (Aug. 1, 1990).
a, d, g, , v, y, al, cl, fl, ml, ni, wl, yl, h2, k2
In re Ernst & Whinney and Ferrante, Initial Decision Release No. 5, 47 SEC
Dock. 93 (June 28, 1990).
a, e, f u, w, cl, gl, ni, ol, pl, rl, vi, a2, b2
In re Hochberg and Webber, 50 S.E.C. 181 (Jan. 11, 1990).
a, d, g, s, v, bl, rl, vi, yl, a2
In re Rodriguez Santos, 50 S.E.C. 99 (Sept. 1, 1989).
h, u, v, y, al, dl, ki, qi, v1, xl, j2, k2
In re Woodside, 50 S.E.C. 76 (Aug. 21, 1989).
h, u, y, al, cl, ki, yl, h2, k2
In re Portney, 50 S.E.C. 68 (Aug. 21, 1989).
h, p, v, bl, gl, ni, vi, wl, h2, k2
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In re Clark, 50 S.E.C. 57 (Aug. 11, 1989).
a, f r, v, bl, gl, ml, rl, vi, wi, yl, a2, c2
In re Mercer, 50 S.E.C. 8 (Apr. 13, 1989).
a, g, r, el, gi, sl, yl, h2, k2
In re Franke and Richard P. Franke & Co., 49 S.E.C. 1112 (Mar. 24, 1989).
e, h, u, bl, gl, hl, ni, qi, v, 12
In re Morrison, 49 S.E.C. 1074 (Feb. 23, 1989).
a, g, s, v, di, ml, ol, p1, sl, vi, 2, k2
In re Van Horn, 49 S.E.C. 982 (Nov. 1, 1988).
h, u, v, y, al, cl, gl, il, Ii, ni, qi, ri, vi, xi, yi, J2, k2
In re Schulzetenberg, 49 S.E.C. 916 (Sept. 23, 1988).
a, f, u, v, cl, gl, ni, ol, ri, vi, wl, yi, a2, c2
In re Abrams, Laskey, and Bunyan, 49 S.E.C. 753 (Feb. 12, 1988).
a, d, g, 4 t, v, cl, ml, ni, ol, pl, ri, vi, wi, c2, e2, k2
In re Rasmussen, Exchange Act Release No. 24,961, 39 SEC Dock. 335
(Sept. 30, 1987).
h, r, v, y, bl, gl, p, qi, rl, si, vi, h2, k2
In re Gilman and Van Son, 49 S.E.C. 720 (Sept. 29, 1987).
a, g, 4 p, s, di, ol, qi, r], vi, f2, k2
In re Berryman, 49 S.E.C. 697 (Sept. 9, 1987).
h, u, el, ml, qi, tI, vi, y], g2, k2
(involved audits of more than one company)
In re KMG Main Hurdman, 49 S.E.C. 668 (Mar. 25, 1987).
e, .f, u, v, b, c, g, ol, qI, r, v, y, a2, k2
(involved audits of more than one company)
In re Kutz, 49 S.E.C. 642 (Jan. 28, 1987).
a, g, p, v, el, g], ol, pl, rl, vi, yl, d2, k2
In re Haney, Securities Act Release No. 6687, 37 SEC Dock. 663 (Jan. 28,
1987).
a, g, al, bl, zI, h2, k2
In re Huber, Erickson & Butler and Erickson, 48 S.E.C. 585 (Oct. 10, 1986).
a, e, g, u, bi, qi, rl, si, vi, g2, k2
In re Jacobs, Exchange Act Release No. 23,644, 36 SEC Dock. 768 (Sept. 24,
1986).
h, u, v, ci, gl, vi, yl, h2, k2
In re Nilssen and Oliver, 48 S.E.C. 570 (Sept. 11, 1986).
a, d, f, u, v, cl, ol, pl, qi, rl, si, vi, b2, c2, k2
(involved audits of more than one company)
In re Rogovin and Debiccari, Exchange Act Release No. 22,956, 35 SEC
Dock. 147 (Feb. 27, 1986).
a, g, p, s, v, w, ai, cl, hi, pl, ri, vi, h2, k2
In re Frantz, Warrick, Strack & Assoc. and Becker, Exchange Act Release
No. 22,885, 35 SEC Dock. 42 (Feb. 10, 1986).
d, e, g, u, bl, gl, ri, ul, vi, wl, y], e2, J2, k2
In re Harrington and Arnott, 48 S.E.C. 340 (Dec. 5, 1985).
a, d, g, u, v, w, cl, 1U, ml, n], ol, ri, vi, yl, c2, J2, k2
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In re Seidman & Seidman, 48 S.E.C. 310 (Oct. 10, 1985).
e, g, u, v, ci, ol, si, vi, yl, a2, k2
In re Schoenfeld & Mendelsohn and Mendelsohn, 48 S.E.C. 295 (Sept. 26,
1985).
a, e, g, p, s, el, gi, 11, ml, ti, vi, yl, a2, d2, k2
In re Rogers, 48 S.E.C. 233 (Aug. 12, 1985).
h, u, v, ci, gl, ol, rl, vi, x1, yl, h2
In re Markman, 48 S.E.C. 216 (July 11, 1985).
a, g, s, v, w, el, li, ml, qi, vi, wl, yl, g2, k2
In re Coopers & Lybrand and Cohen, 48 S.E.C. 49 (Nov. 27, 1984).
a, e, f p, s, cl, yl
(no sanctions given, yet settlement; see supra part III.B.)
Note: Because Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (per
curiam) has been remanded, it was not included in the survey.
